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L Introduction
On June 8, 1999, the American Bar Association Commission on Multi-
disciplinary Practice (Commission on MDPs) recommended that the American
Bar Association (ABA) change the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to
allow lawyers to split fees with nonlawyers and to deliver legal services
through multidisciplinary practices (MDPs)' Philip S. Anderson, then Presi-
dent of the ABA, appointed the Commission on MDPs in August 1998 in
response to significant debate among practitioners and scholars regarding the
appropriateness of MDPs.2 Recent developments in national and world mar-
kets prompted the appointment of the Commission on MDPs.3 In particular,
1. See American BarAssociation Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Report to
the House ofDelegates: Recommendation 2, at http/www.abanetorg/pr/mdprecommenda-
tion.html (last visited Sept 13, 2000) [hereinafter Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
Report: Recommendation] (recommending that ABA revise Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct to allow lawyers and nonlawyers to enter into partnerships) (copy on file with Washington
and Lee Law Review). In this Note, multidisciplinary practice, or MDP, refers to "a partner-
ship, professional corporation, or other association or entity that includes lawyers and non-
lawyers and has as one, but not all, of its purposes the delivery of legal services to a client(s) ...
or that holds itself out to the public as providing nonlegal, as well as legal, services." Id. 3.
2. See Background Paper on Multidisciplinary Practice: Issues and Developments
99 1-4, at httpJ/www.abanet.org/epr/mulicomreport0199.html (last visited Sept 13, 2000)
(outlining origin of Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice) (copy on file with Washington
and Lee Law Review). The Commission on MDPs is made up of twelve members from various
backgrounds, including practitioners, judges and academics. Id. 4.
3. See id. 11 1-3 (explaining that as global economy grows "business clients look to
teams of professionals from different disciplines for consolidated advice on complex commer-
cial and regulatory issues").
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the Big Five4 accounting firms' delivery of legal services outside the United
States attracted the attention of both the ABA5 and commentators.6 The ABA
also recognized that numerous accounting firms in the United States were
aggressively attempting to provide various legal services to their clients.' With
the recent growth of nonlegal professional service firms, more and more
lawyers are joining firms that are not controlled by lawyers and do not resem-
ble traditional law firms! Accounting and other professional firms have
sought to avoid the ethical dilemmas that such employment raises by contend-
ing that lawyers are not practicing law, but merely rendering advice or consult-
ing services.9 Legal commentators disagree about whether the Model Rules
allow lawyers who work for accounting firms to perform these services.10
Some scholars believe that by addressing MDPs the Commission on MDPs
really is addressing howto regulate entities that, to some extent, already exist."
4. See Rick Telberg, The Top 100: Going Strong Into the Millennium, ACCT. TODAY,-
Mar. 15, 1999, at 4 (noting that "Big Five" is commonly used to refer to Anderson Worldwide,
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, and KPMG).
5. See Background Paper on Multidisciplinary Practice: Issues and Developments,
supra note 2, 11 7-12 (noting that some countries allow accounting firms to provide legal
services that United States prohibits and that accounting firms are actively pursuing clients in
diverse markets which allow such services).
6. See John E. Morris, London Bracesfor the Big Six Invasion, AM. LAW., Dec. 1996,
at 5 (discussing Big Six assault on European legal market and possible mergers in England); M.
Peter Moser, The Argument for Change, EXPERIENCE, Summer 1999, at 4, 6 (noting that
accounting firms have merged with law firms in Europe and discussing presence of Price-
waterhouseCoopers in France); Gianluca Morello, Note, Big Six Accounting Fins Shop
Worldwide for Law Firms: Why Multi-Discipline Practices Should be Permitted in the United
States, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L. 190, 190-93 (1997) (noting that recently "Big Six accounting
firms... have moved into the legal services market by establishing, acquiring, or forming ties
with law firms around the world").
7. See Background Paper on Multidisciplinary Practice: Issues and Developments,
supra note 2, 13-15 (noting that accounting firm services often include employee-lawyer
representation of clients in federal district court or court of federal claims and that accounting
firms have started recruiting heavily from law schools, have increased both in number and size,
and have started entering into "strategic alliances" with prominent tax law firms).
8. John H. Matheson & Edward S. Adams, Not "If'But "How's" Reflecting on theABA
Commission'sRecommendations on MulidisciplinaryPractice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1269,1272
(2000); see Lowell 3. Noteboom, Professions in Convergence: Taking the Next Step, 84 MNN.
L. REV. 1359, 1362 (2000) (noting that today accountant/consultants provide "nearly the same
range of services and advice offered by full-service law firms, with the exception of (1) direct
representation of clients in litigation, and (2) drafting the final version of key documents in
estate plans, mergers or acquisitions").
9. Matheson & Adams, supra note 8, at 1272.
10. See id. ("It is still largely unsettled whether the Model Rules prevent lawyers who
work for accounting firms from performing these services.")
11. See Charles W. Wolfram, The ABA and MDPs: ContexA History, and Process, 84
MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1636-38 (suggesting that recent expansion by Big Five into other activi-
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However, large professional firms are not the only ones interested in MDPs. 2
Small firm partnership possibilities include estate planning, financial planning,
juvenile defense work, and family counseling. 3
After the Commission on MDPs made its recommendation in June 1999,
the accounting firm of Ernst & Young further focused national attention on
the issue of MDPs by launching the Washington, D.C.-based law firm of
McKee Nelson Ernst & Young. 4 The creation of this new law-accounting
firm was possible because the District of Columbia Bar Rules, which unlike
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, allow fee sharing between lawyers
and nonlawyers as long as the sole purpose of the entity is to provide legal
services. 5 Washington, D.C. is currently the only jurisdiction in the United
States that allows lawyers to enter into MDPs.' 6
At the August 1999 annual meeting ofthe ABA in Atlanta, the House of
Delegates, after considering the Commission on MDPs' report and recommen-
dation, adopted a resolution providing that MDPs not be permitted unless or
until additional study indicates that the change will advance the public interest
without adversely affecting lawyers' independence and commitment to
clients." Following the House of Delegates's adoption of this resolution, the
ties, including acquiring hordes of lawyers, brought MDP issue to organized bar's attention and
noting that many lawyers in large firms feel that MDPs already exist).
12. Id. at 1648.
13. Id. at 1649.
14. See Sheryl Stratton, Ernst & YoungLaw Firm AddsPartners, TAX NOTES, Nov. 22,
1999, at 989 (discussing McKee Nelson Ernst & Young's press release announcing addition of
five new partners); Sheryl Stratton, Ernst & Young Launches First Domestic Law Firm, TAX
NOTES, Nov. 8, 1999, at 719 (discussing Ernst & Young press release announcing its decision
to finance law firm in District of Columbia).
15. See WASHNGTON, D.C. RULES OFPRoFEsSIONALCONDUCTRuIe 5A(b) (1997) (per-
mitting lawyer to practice in partnerships with nonlawyers who assist in provision of legal
services to clients).
16. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT 448 (4th ed. 1999)
(stating that Washington, D.C. permits partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers if certain
requirements are met); STMIHN GEiLRS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUrEs AND STANDARDS 293-95 (1996) (noting District of Columbia adopted rule to allow
lawyers and nonlawyers to enter partnerships).
17. See Commision on MultidisciplinaryPractice: Florida BarRecommendation State-
ment, at http'//www.abanetorg/cpr/flbarrec.html (last visited Sept 13, 2000) (adopting Florida
Bar proposed resolution) (copy on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). The resolution
states:
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association make no change, addition or
amendment to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct which permits a lawyer to
offer legal services though a multidisciplinary practice unless and until additional
study demonstrates that such changes will further the public interest without sacri-
ficing or compromising lawyer independence and the legal profession's tradition
of loyalty to clients.
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Commission on MDPs continued to solicit input from interested parties and
investigate the consequences of allowing MDPs. 8 Following the ABA's lead,
numerous state bar associations have begun to study and discuss MDPs."9 On
February 13, 2000, at the ABA's midyear meeting in Dallas, the ABA held a
"town hall" meeting to allow interested parties to represent and discuss all
perspectives on MDPs.20 However, the August resolution to table consider-
ation of the Commission on MDPs' recommendation remained in effect
throughout the meeting of the House of Delegates on February 14 and 15,
2000.21 In March 2000, the Commission on MDPs released an additional
Recommendation to the ABA House of Delegates that made minor adjust-
ments to the original recommendation.22 At the July 2000 annual meeting of
18. See Vdliam G. Paul, ToMDP or Not to MDP, A.BA 3., Dec. 1999, at 6 (noting that
commission members have continued to gather information on MDPs since ABA meeting in
August 1999).
19. See Wade Baxley, Please Mr. Custer, IDon 't Wanna Go, 61 ALA. LAW. 6, 7 (noting
that Alabama has appointed MDP task force "with its mission being to consider what impact
MDP will have on the practice of law in Alabama or upon the access to legal services, as well
as its impact upon the licensing and regulation of lawyers in Alabama"); Toby BrownAccount-
ing 101forLawyers or Too Late, You Lose?, UTAHB.J., May 1999, at 8 ("The Utah State Bar
has established a Task Force on Multidisciplinary Practice 'MDP' as well."); Jan Pudlow, MDP
Question Still Open, FLA. B. NEWS, Feb. 15,2000, at 1 (noting that Florida's Special Committee
on Multidisciplinary Practice and Ancillary Business has not made its recommendations to
Florida Board of Governors); Louis N. Tet, MDPs: The Debate Continues, PA. LAW., Jan.-Feb.
2000, at 2 (stating that Pennsylvania Bar Association "created its own Commission on Multi-
disciplinary Practice and Related Trends Affecting the Legal Profession").
20. See Dallas 2000: Midyear Meeting 1, at http:/www.abanetorg/mdp (last visited
Feb. 26, 2000) (announcing that "panel of experts participated in an interactive 'Town Hall'
style discussion of multidisciplinary practice and its implications for the profession") (copy on
file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. See Teti, supra note 19, at 2 (noting that "it is clear that the ABA intends to consider
another proposal regarding MDPs at its annual meeting in mid-July 2000").
22. See generallyAmerican BarAssociation Commission on Mulidisciplinary Practice
Report to the House ofDelegates: Recommendation, athttp'Ilwww.abanetorgscpr/mdpfinalrep
2000.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2000) (copy on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
The Commission on MDPs' revised Recommendation states:
RESOLVED, that the American BarAssociation amend the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct consistent with the following principles:
1. Lawyers should be permitted to share fees and join with nonlawyer profession-
als in a practice that delivers both legal and nonlegal professional services
(Multidisciplinary Practice), provided that the lawyers have the control and
authority necessary to assure lawyer independence in the rendering of legal
services. "Nonlawyer professionals" means members of recognized professions
or other disciplines that are governed by ethical standards.
2. This Recommendation must be implemented in a manner that protects the
public and preserves the core values of the legal profession, including compe-
tence, independence of professional judgment, protection of confidential client
information, loyalty to the client through the avoidance of conflicts of interest,
and pro bonopublico obligations.
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the ABA, the House of Delegates debated the Commission on MDPs' new
recommendation and adopted a recommendation urging each jurisdiction to
maintain the prohibition on partnerships and fee sharing between lawyers and
nonlawyers.23 The House of Delegates also dissolved the Commission on
MDPs 4 However, the ABA's refusal to amend the Model Rules does not
resolve the controversy surrounding MDPs. "This profoundly anti-experimen-
tal stance may only encourage MDP supporters to leave the fractious ABA on
the sidelines while they pursue legalization elsewhere."25
This Note considers whether the ABA should amend the Model Rules to
allow lawyers and nonlawyers to form MDPs. This Note argues that the
traditional arguments againstpartnerships betweenlawyers and nonlawyers are
inadequate to justify the prohibition on MDPs.2' Because of the lack of ade-
quate reasoning to justify the current prohibition on MDPs, this Note proposes
that the ABA should amend the Model Rules to accommodate MDPs in order
to provide some guidance to the number of states that presently are considering
MDPsY In Part IL this Note will survey the history and development of the
ABA's prohibition on partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers.2 Part III
3. Regulatory authorities should enforce existing rules and adopt such additional
enforcement procedures as are needed to implement these principles and to
protect the public interest
4. The prohibition on nonlawyers delivering legal services and the obligations of
all lawyers to observe the rules of professional conduct should not be altered.
5. Passive investment in a Multidisciplinary Practice should not be permitted.
Id.
23. American Bar Association: Recommendation 7-8, at httpA/www.ababnetorg/cpr/
mdprecomlOF.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2000) (copy on file with Washington and Lee Law
Review). The Recommendation states in part:
7. The sharing of legal fees with non-lawyers and the ownership and control of the
practice of law by nonlawyers are inconsistent with the core values of the legal
profession.
8. The law governing lawyers, that prohibits lawyers from sharing legal fees with
nonlawyers and from directly or indirectly transferring to nonlawyers owner-
ship or control over entities practicing law, should not be revised.
Id.
24. Id.
25. Ted SchneyerMultidisciplinaryPractice, ProfessionalRegulation, andtheAnti-Inter-
ference Principle in Legal Ethics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1469, 1475 (2000). Although Professor
Schneyer made this statement in response to the House of Delegates decision to table consider-
ation of the Commission's original recommendation, it is equally applicable here.
26. See infia Part VIII (arguing that traditional arguments for prohibiting partnerships
between lawyers and nonlawyers are inadequate tojustify total prohibition on MDPs).
27. See infra Part VM (arguing that ABA should amend Model Rules to accommodate
MDPs in order to provide some guidance to number of states considering MDPs).
28. See infra Part II (recounting history and development of ABA's prohibition on part-
nerships between attorneys and other professionals).
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recounts attempts by two jurisdictions to. reject the traditional prohibition on
MDPs. Parts IV and V examine the traditional arguments for and againstmaintaining the prohibition on MDPs3 0 Part VI describes the Commission on
MDPs' original recommendation to the ABA House of Delegates.3' Part VII
analyzes the Commission on MDPs' original recommendation in light of the
traditional arguments against MDPs and recommends a number of changes to
the Model Rules to accommodate MDPs and protect the "core values" of the
legal profession.32 Finally, Part VIII concludes that the ABA should make the
recommended changes to the Model Rules in order to provide state bar associa-
tions with some guidance.3
f. History and Development of the Prohibition on MDPs
The Canons of Professional Ethics, which the ABA originally promul-
gated in 1908, contained no rules expressly prohibiting lawyers from entering
into partnerships with nonlawyers. 4 In 1928, the ABA adopted Canons 33,
34, and 35, which prohibited practicing lawyers from entering into partner-
ships or associations withnonlawyers. 5 The ABA adopted the prohibition out
of fear that laymen working in partnerships with lawyers would undermine the
integrity of the legal profession and cause the general public to lose confi-
dence in the justice system.36 Specifically, Canon 33 stated that "[p]artner-
ships between lawyers and members of other professions or non-professional
persons should not be formed or permitted where a part of the partnership
29. See infra Part IMI (discussing attempts by North Dakota and Washington, D.C. to
reject traditional prohibition on MDPs).
30. See infra Parts IV and V (examining traditional arguments surrounding MDP debate).
31. See infra Part VI (describing Commission on MDPs' Recommendation to ABA
House of Delegates).
32. See infra Part VII (analyzing Commission on MDPs' recommendation in light of
traditional arguments against MDPs and advocating changes to Model Rules to accommodate
MDPs and protect "core values" of legal profession).
33. See infra Part VIII (concluding thatABA should amend Model Rules to accommodate
MDPs in order to provide some guidance to number of states considering MDPs).
34. See Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board? A
Proposalfor Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1,4 (1998) ("As originally
promulgated, the Canons did not address whether practicing lawyers could enter into business
associations with nonlawyers.").
35. See Proceedings of the Fifty-FirstAnnualMeeting ofAmerican BarAssociation, 53
REP. OF THE A.B.A 29, 119-31 (1928) (discussing additions to Canons of Professional Ethics).
36. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SuppLEMn NG TE
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETEICS: ANNOTATED CANONS 11 (1926) (suggesting that partner-
ships between lawyers and nonlawyers would impair "ethical and professional standards, and
[destroy] public confidence in the lawyers and the courts with a clamor for recall ofjudges and
decisions").
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business consists of the practice of law."37 However, even at this early point,
there were strong objections to the new canons prohibiting MDPs3 Despite
these objections to the new canons, the ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics and Grievances consistently interpreted Canons 33, 34, and 35 to pro-
hibit "any business association between lawyers and nonlawyers that offered
legal services.
'39
The ABA replaced the Canons of Professional Ethics with the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code) in 1969.' Within eleven
years, almost every state had adopted a modified version ofthe Model Code.4"
The Model Code retained the restriction found in the post-1928 version ofthe
Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting lawyers and nonlawyers from
entering into partnerships.42 Canon 33 appeared inthe Model Code as Disci-
plinary Rule (DR) 3-103(A), which stated that "[a] lawyer shall not form a
partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist
of the practice of law."'43 Additionally, the Model Code retained the principal
restrictions of Canons 34 and 35."
37. See Canons ofProfessionalEthics,53 REP. oFTBEA.BA. 769,778(1928) (providing
standards of professional conduct expected of legal profession). Canon 34 stated that "[n]o
division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division
of service or responsibility." Id. Canon 35 provided that "[tihe professional services of a
lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any agency, personal or corporate, which
intervenes between client and lawyer... [a lawyer] should avoid all relations which direct the
performance of his duties in the interest of such intermediary." Id. at 779.
38. See Report of the Special Committee on Supplements to the Canons of Professional
Ethics, 52 REP. OF ThE A.BA. 372, 378 (1927) (acknowledging that "there is substantial
difference of view in the profession respecting its recommendations as to partnerships, division
of fees, intermediaries, and the bonding of lawyers"). One member of the drafting committee
even stated that "aside from professional policy, there is nothing inherently 'unethical' in the
formation of partnerships between lawyers largely engaged in certain kinds of work and an
expert engineer, student of finance, or some other form of expert." Id. at 388 (minority view
of F.W. Grinnell).
39. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 5-6 (discussing broad interpretation ABA
Commission on Professional Ethics and Grievances took concerning prohibitions on partner-
ships between lawyers and nonlawyers under Canons 33, 34, and 35).
40. See GKnLErM & SIMON, supra note 16, at 423-24 (discussing promulgation process of
Model Code).
41. See id. (noting widespread adoption of Model Code among most states, quickly
replacing Canons of Professional Ethics nationwide).
42. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 6-7 (noting that Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility retained major provisions of Canons 33, 34, and 35).
43. SeeMODELCODEOFPRoFEssiONALRESPoNSmIrITDR3-103(A)(1980)[herenfter
MODEL CODE] (prohibiting lawyers from forming MDPs).
44. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 6-7 (describing provisions in Model Code
which contain principal restrictions found in Canons 34 and 35 of Canons of Professional
Ethics). The prohibition against fee-splitling with nonlawyers found in Canon 34 appeared in
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In 1977, the ABA established the Commission on the Evaluation of Pro-
fessional Standards to consider the rules governing the practice of law and to
recommend any necessary changes.4" This commission became known as the
Kutak Commission, named after its chairman, Robert J. Kutak. The Kutak
Commission rejected the view espoused in the Canons of Professional Ethics
and the Model Code that the ABA should prohibit lawyers from entering into
partnerships with nonlawyers The Kutak Commission attacked various
bases for the traditional prohibition on partnerships between lawyers and
nonlawyers, including the belief that these partnerships impede professional
judgment and invite the unauthorized practice of law.4"
When Proposed Rule 5.4 came before the ABA House of Delegates, some
delegates strongly opposed it on a number of grounds.49 Opponents of the
Disciplinary Rule DR 3-102(A). See id. at 7 (noting DR 3-102 prohibits lawyers from splitting
fees with nonlawyers). DR 5-107(B), DR 5-107(C) and Ethical Consideration (EC) 3-3 gave
new life to the general provisions of Canon 35. See id. (examining several provisions of Model
Code).
45. See GnLERS & SIMON, supra note 16, at 3-4 (describing process establishing Model
Rules of Professional Conduct).
46. See GEoFFREY C. HAZARD, J,ET AL, THE LAW AND EnICS OFLAWYERiNG 15 (3d
ed. 1999) (discussing ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards).
47. See Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 107 REP. OF
THE A.BA 828, 886-87 (1982) (describing Kutak Commission's Proposed Rule 5.4). The
Kutak Commission's draft contained Proposed Rule 5.4, which stated:
A lawyer may be employed by an organization in which a financial interest is
held or managerial authority is exercised by a nonlawyer, or by a lawyer acting in
a capacity other than that of representing clients, such as a business corporation,
insurance company, legal services organization or government agency, but only if
the terms of the relationship provide in writing that
(a) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship;
(b) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by
Rule 1.6;
(c) the arrangement does not involve advertising or personal contact with
prospective clients prohibited by Rules 72 and 73; and
(d) the arrangement does not result in charging a fee that violates Rule 1.5.
Id.
48. See COMMISSIONONEVALUATIONOFPROFESSIONALSTANDARDS,PROPOSEDFNAL
DRAFT: AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 176-78
(1981) (criticizing legal background for traditional prohibition against partnerships between
lawyers and nonlawyers found in Model Code).
49. SeeProceedings of the 1983MidyearMeetingof the House ofDelegates, 108 REP. OF
THE ABdA 284,352-55 (1983) (discussing debate that surrounded Proposed Rule 5.4 in House
of Delegates); Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 10-11 (discussing objections raised to
Kutak Commission's Proposal to allow partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers); Thomas
IR Andrews,Nonlaiyers in the Business ofLaw: Does the One Who Has the GoldRealty Make
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 951 (2000)
Kutak Commission's position arguedthat large companies like Sears and Mont-
gomery Ward would drive many traditional law firms out of business and that
nonlawyer influence on lawyers would impede lawyers' professional judg-
ment."° Opponents also were concerned that nonlawyer influence would force
lawyers to compromise professionalismto achieve economic goals and that the
proposal would have an uncertain effect on the legal profession in general.5
These objections prevailed, and the House of Delegates passed a version of
Rule 5.4(a) that expressed the Model Rules' prohibition against MDPs. 2
On August 2, 1983, the ABA House of Delegates formally adopted the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules). 3 As finally adopted by
the ABA, Rule 5.4 of the Model Rules contained the prohibition against
partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers that appeared in both the Model
Code and the 1928 version of the Canons of Professional Ethics.'M Specifi-
cally, Rule 5.4(a) prohibits a lawyer or law firm from splitting fees with a
nonlawyer except in certain listed circumstances. 5 5 Rule 5.4(b) prohibits a
lawyer and nonlawyer from entering into a partnership "if any ofthe activities
of the partnership consist of the practice of law.""6 Under Rule 5.4(c), a non-
the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 595-96 (1989) (noting various House of Delegates's objec-
tions to Proposed Rule 5.4); Morello, supra note 6, at 212-13 (discussing reasons ABA House
of Delegates dropped Proposed Rule 5.4 in favor of traditional prohibition).
50. See Andrews, supra note 49, at 595 (discussing specific objections ABA House of
Delegates raised to partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers).
51. See id. (noting concerns that numerous delegates expressed regarding Kutak Commis-
sion's proposal).
52. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 46, at 982 (explaining that ABA dropped Kutak
Commission's proposal in favor of traditional prohibition against partnerships between lawyers
and nonlawyers and examining reasons behind House of Delegates decision).
53. See OGLRS & SIMON, supra note 16, at 3 (discussing history of Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and their adoption in ABA House of Delegates).
54. See MODELRULES OFPROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 5.4 (1999) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES] (listing rules governing professional independence oflawyers).
55. See id. Rule 5.4(a) (prohibiting sharing of legal fees with nonlawyers). Model Rule
5.4(a) states:
A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that.
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may
provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the
lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate orto one or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared
lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other
representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price; and
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or
retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-
sharing arrangement
Id.
56. See id. Rule 5.4(b) (prohibiting partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers).
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lawyer who is not a client of the lawyer may not control or interfere with the
professional judgment of the lawyer.57 Finally, Rule 5.4(d) lists situations in
which the Model Rules prohibit a lawyer from forming a professional corpora-
tion or association for the purpose of practicing law. 8 Thus, Model Rule 5.4
preserves the prohibition against partnerships between lawyers and non-
lawyers that was seen first in Canons 33, 34, and 35 ofthe Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics 9 and continued in the Model Code.
60
The majority of states have adopted the Model Rules, either in their
entirety or in significant part.' Additionally, many of the states that have not
adopted the Model Rules have adopted modified versions of the Model
Code.62 In fact, all United States jurisdictions, with the exception of the
District of Columbia, have adopted ethical guidelines that are consistent with
the ABA's prohibition against MDPs.6'
LU Jurisdictional Attempts to Reject the Traditional Prohibition
Against MDPs
Since the ABA rejected the Kutak Commission's proposal, two jurisdic-
tions have attempted to amend their bar rules to allow lawyers and nonlawyers
57. See id. Rule 5.4(c) (prohibiting nonlawyer interference with professional judgment
of lawyer). Model Rule 5.4(c) states that "[a] lawyer shall not permit a person who recom-
mends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the
lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services." Id.
58. See id. Rule 5.4(d) (restricting lawyer's ability to enter into professional corporation
or association). The specific instances in which a lawyer is prevented from forming such a
corporation are:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of
the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reason-
able time during administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a
lawyer.
Id.
59. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (describing provisions of Canons 33,
34, and 35 and objections raised thereto).
60. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (discussing Model Code provision
prohibiting lawyers from entering into MDPs).
61. See Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 01:3-01:4 (Dec. 22, 1999) (listing
jurisdictions that have adopted Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
62. See HAZARD ET AL, supra note 46, at 15 (noting that "[s]ome states ... have decided
to retain their version of the Model Code although often with numerous adjustments based on
provisions in the Model Rules").
63. See Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA), supra note 61, at 91:401 (noting that
Washington, D.C. is only jurisdiction in United States that permits lawyers and nonlawyers to
enter partnerships).
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to enter into MDPs.' The District of Columbia successfully amended its bar
rules to allow the formation of MDPs, but only where the sole purpose of the
MDP is to provide legal services.6' North Dakota also considered amending
its ethical regulations to allow partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers.'
However, the North Dakota Supreme Court balked at the proposed change.'
A. District of Columbia
Washington, D.C. is presently the only jurisdiction in the United States
that rejected the ABA's total prohibition of partnerships betwem lawyers and
nonlawyers.' The District of Columbia Bar abandonedthe prohibition against
MDPs because it recognized an increasing demand for a broad range ofprofes-
sional services from a single provider.69 However, in order to address the
ethical concerns associated with MDPs, the District of Columbia's Rule of
Professional Conduct 5.4 (D.C. Rule 5.4) imposes traditional ethical require-
ments on any multidisciplinary organization created under the rule."° D.C.
Rule 5.4 allows a lawyer to practice law in a partnership with a nonlawyer
whose professional services are helpful in providing legal services to clients
provided certain requirements are met.71 The rule allows such a partnership
64. See infra notes 68-88 and accompanying text (discussing District of Columbia's and
North Dakota's attempts to change their bar rules).
65. See infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text (discussing amendment to District of
Columbia's Rules of Professional Conduct allowing lawyers to enter MDPs).
66. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (recounting North Dakota's proposal
to allow lawyers and nonlawyers to enter partnerships).
67. See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text (discussing North Dakota Supreme
Court's rejection of North Dakota's Professional Conduct Subcommittee's recommendation).
68. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (noting that District of Columbia is only
jurisdiction to reject prohibition against MDPs).
69. See WAsHINGTON, D.C. RULES OF PRoPESSIONALCONDUCT Rule 5.4 cmt 3 (1997)
(explaining reason for adoption of non-traditional rule). The comment to Rule 5.4 provides in
part:
As the demand increased for a broad range of professional services from a single
source, lawyers employed professionals from other disciplines to work for them.
So long as the nonlawycrs remained employees of the lawyers, these relationships
did not violate the disciplinary rules. However, when lawyers and nonlawyers
considered forming partnerships and professional corporations to provide a combi-
nation of legal and other services to the public, they faced serious obstacles under
the former rules.
Id.
70. See id. Rule 5A cmt 4 (explaining that Rule 5A rejects absolute prohibition against
MDPs but continues to impose traditional ethical requirements upon them).
71. See id. Rule 5.4(b) (allowing partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers in certain
circumstances).
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only if it exists solely to provide legal services,"2 the managers and financial
interest holders of the partnership commit to abide bythe rules of professional
conduc , 3 and the lawyers with managerial authority or financial interest inthe
partnership take responsibility over the nonlawyers as if the nonlawyers were
lawyers. 74 Furthermore, the lawyers must clearly explain the conditions and
agree to them in writing.75 D.C. Rule 5.4 also permits fee-splitting between
lawyers and nonlawyers in certain circumstances."6 However, D.C. Rule'5.4
retains the Model Rules' prohibition against nonlawyers directing or regulating
a lawyer's professional judgment in the rendering of legal services."
B. North Dakota
In 1986, North Dakota considered abandoning the traditional prohibitions
against MDPs in favor of a rule that closely resembled-the Kutak Commission's
version of Model Rule 5.4.8 North Dakota's Professional Conduct Study
Subcommittee of the Attorney Standards Committee (Subcommittee) recom-
mended replacingthe ABA's Model Rule 5.4 with a substitute that would allow
partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers."9 According to Larry Spears,
72. See id. Rule 5A(bXl) (requiring partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers to
provide only legal services).
73. See id. Rule 5.4(bX2) (requiring all partners in MDPs to abide by Washington, D.C.
Rules of Professional Conduct).
74. See id. Rule 5.4(bX3) (rendering lawyers in MDPs responsible for conduct of non-
lawyers).
75. See id. Rule 5.4(bX4) (requiring partners in MDPs to agree to requirements inwriting).
76. See id. Rule 5.4(a) (listing circumstances in which lawyer may share fees with
nonlawyer). D.C. Rule 5.4(a) tracks the provisions of Rule 5.4(a) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, but allows for the sharing of fees "in a partnership or other form of
organization" that is permissible under D.C. Rule 5.4(b). Id. Rule 5.4(aX4).
77. See id. Rule 5A(c) (mirroring language of Rule 5.4(c) of Model Rules of Professional
Conduct which prohibits nonlawyer control of lawyer's professional judgment).
78. See Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner: Moderate Proposals
Deserve a Chance, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 383, 400 (1988) (describing North Dakota's
flirtation with Kutak Commission's version of Model Rule 5.4).
79. See id. (explaining development of North Dakota's Proposed Rule 5.4). The final
proposal of the subcommittee stated:
Except as prohibited or restricted by law, a lawyer may provide legal services to a
client in association with a nonlawyer if-
(a) The association does not permit any interference with the lawyer's independent
professional judgment or with the client -lawyer relationship;
(b) Information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by
these rules;
(c) The association does not result in communication about the lawyer, a person
professionally associated with the lawyer or their services which violates these
rules; and
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Assistant State CourtAdministrator forthe North Dakota Supreme Court, some
of the members of the Subcommittee believed that the Model Rule's prohibi-
tion against MDPs violated the First Amendment by impinging upon lawyers'
freedom of association.8" In a statewide vote, bar members approved the
proposed rule.81 Shortlythereafter, the state bar's Board of Governors and the
Attorney Standards Committee also voted to approve the proposal.' While the
North Dakota Supreme Court was reviewing the proposal, however, the Na-
tional Law Journalr8 and Business Week 84 published articles asserting that
adoption of the Subcommittee's proposal would lead to "lay acquisition of law
firms."8 5 According to the assistant court administrator for the North Dakota
Supreme Court, the articles inspired a number of letters to the supreme court
prophesying that "the world would come to an end if Sears came in."86 On
April 16,1987, the North Dakota Supreme Court; withoutindicating anyreason
for doing so, rejected the Subcommittee's Proposed Rule 5.4 and adopted the
Model Rule's language prohibiting MDPs.' The court approved the Model
Rules on April 22, 1987.88
IV Traditional Objections to MDPs
Opponents of MDPs have raised numerous objections to partnerships
between lawyers and nonlawyers.89 Some opponents argue that MDPs will
(d) The association does not result in the client being charged a fee that violates
these rules.
Id. at 400-01 (quoting Professional Conduct Study Subcommittee of Attorney Standards Com-
mittee, proposed North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct (1986)).
80. See id. at 401 (discussing reasons behind North Dakota's Proposed Rule 5.4).
81. See id. at 401-02 (describing process by which North Dakota's Proposed Rule 5.4
ascended to North Dakota Supreme Court for approval and adoption).
82. See id. (describing process by which North Dakota's Proposed Rule 5A ascended to
North Dakota Supreme Court for approval and adoption).
83. David A. Koplan, Ethics Change in Works: Want to Invest in a Law Firm?, NAT'L
L.., Jan. 19, 1987, at 1.
84. Paula Dwyer, Soon Anybody May be Able to Own a Law Firm, Bus. Wk, Jan. 26,
1987, at42.
85. See Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 78, at 402 (describing articles in National Law
Journal and Business Week and noting that articles prompted numerous lawyers to voice their
concerns regarding nonlawyer ownership of law firms to North Dakota Supreme Court).
86. Id.
87. See id. (recounting North Dakota Supreme Court's rejection of Proposed Rule 5.4 and
approval of version found in Model Rules).
88. See id. (recounting North Dakota Supreme Court's rejection of Proposed Rule 5.4 and
approval of version found in Model Rules).
89. See infra notes 95-262 and accompanying text (describing traditional objections raised
to MDPs).
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adversely affect the legal profession by compromising lawyers' professional
independence ofjudgment and by making it easier for nonlawyers to engage
in the unauthorized practice of law.91 Others argue that MDPs also will hurt
clients by jeopardizing client confidentiality and privileged communica-
tions? 3 Additionally, opponents fear that MDPs threaten lawyers' economic
self-interest.9 4
A. Professional Independence ofJudgment
One of the most frequently raised arguments in support of Model Rule
5.4 is that its prohibition on nonlawyer supervision of attorneys prevents
laypersons from impairing or adversely affecting a lawyer's professional
independence of judgment.' In fact; the official comment to Model Rule 5.4
states that "[tlhese limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional inde-
pendence of judgment."' As Professor Luban pointed out, the "professional
independence of lawyers" argument has two aspects?' Not only are lawyers
to be independent from third parties who may attempt to influence the law-
yer's judgment,"8 but lawyers also are required to be independent from the
client.9
90. See infra notes 95-105, 122-24 and accompanying text (noting that opponents fear
that MDPs would compromise lawyer's professional judgment).
91. See infra notes 214-30 and accompanying text (discussing opponents' argument that
MDPs encourage unauthorized practice of law).
92. See infra notes 142-50, 166-70 and accompanying text (noting that opponents argue
that MDPs will imperil client confidentiality).
93. See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text (noting that opponents argue that
MDPs will endanger communications covered by attorney-client privilege).
94. See infra notes 251-59 and accompanying text (explaining that underlying rationale
for prohibition on MDPs is economic protectionism).
95. See Commisson onMultidisciplinaryPractice: Report 9, athttp//www.abanetorg
cpr/mdpreporthtml (last modified Aug. 1999) (noting that most frequently raised objection
before Commission was that lawyers' professional judgment would be impaired by nonlawycr
supervision) (copy on file with Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Andrews, supra
note 49, at 601 (reporting that nonlawyer interest solely in making money is common objection
against allowing nonlawyer involvement in practice of law); Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 78,
at 406 (mentioning that ABA is concerned that business practices will impair ethical obligations
of legal profession).
96. See MODEL RULES, supra note 54, Rule 5.4 cmt (providing reasoning behind promul-
gation of Model Rule 5.4).
97. See David LubanAsking the Right Questions, 72 TENP. L. REV. 839,842-43 (1999)
(arguing that "ABA report on multidisciplinary practice focuses exclusively on.., lawyers'
independence from nonlawyers").
98. Id. at 842.
99. Id. at 843.
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1. Independence from Third Parties
Some scholars' argue that MDPs will threaten lawyers' professional inde-
pendence from third parties. They suggest that nonlawyers with a financial
interest in a partnership or association may pressure a lawyer to maximize
profits to such an extent that the lawyer compromises his own professional
judgment. °'0 For instance, an attorney may begin to make decisions that are
in the best interests of the organization, not the client. 01 This concern isprimarily about jeopardizing client loyalty."° Opponents argue that non-
lawyers are unlikely to comprehend or accept that a lawyer must often do
more than is required by a particular rule of conduct to comply with profes-
sional obligations.103 During the debate surrounding the Kutak Commission's
proposal, one delegate argued that a nonlawyer partner would only be con-
cerned with what service is "cost effective," not with what is necessary to
perform a job properly.1°4 One scholar even asserted that MDPs will jeopar-
dize pro bono work because nonlawyers will pressure lawyers to maximize
profits and will not want their firms representing indigent criminalsY'05
Other scholars have raised numerous counter arguments to the proposi-
tion that MDPs will interfere with lawyers' professional independence from
third parties."t 6 First, the proposition presupposes that a desire to make a
100. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 16 (describing argument raised by
opponents of MDPs); Cindy Alberta Carson, Under New Mismanagement The Problem of
Non-Lawyer Equity Partnerships in Law Fms, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 593, 611-13 (1994)
(asserting that "non-lawyer partner's primary concern is likely to be a good return on his invest-
ment").
101. Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 16.
102. See EleanorW. Myers, Examininglndependence andLoyalty, 72 TEaIP. L.REV. 857,
861 (1999) (suggesting that concern about independence from third parties "is primarily a
concern about impairing client loyalty").
103. See Carson, supra note 100, at 601-02 (arguing that nonlawyer partners create greater
risk of impeding lawyer's professional judgment than managing partners who are lawyers);
Lawrence J. FoxAccountants the Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul Our Nest and
Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1106
(2000) (arguing that Rule 5.4 guards against "interference by nonlaw trained masters who wish
us to take short cuts to maximize profits").
104. See Andrews, supra note 49, at 601-02 (citing Unedited Transcript of ABA House of
Delegates Session 41-42 (Feb. 8,1983)).
105. See Fox, supra note 103, at 1112-13 (suggesting that MDPs will compromise legal
profession's commitment to pro bono).
106. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 16-19 (raising number of arguments that
MDPs do not threaten professional independence of lawyers); Andrews, supra note 49, at 602-
03 (same); Carson, supra note 100, at 611-13 (noting MDP proponents argue that nonlawyers
will respect ethical obligations of lawyers and thus not interfere with lawyers professional
judgment); Gilbert & Lempert supra note 78, at 406-07 (arguing that adequate restraints could
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profit will adversely affect the provision of legal services."° Yet, no empiri-
cal evidence supports this assumption." In fact, such a proposition ignores
that, for more than thirty years, lawyers have operated law firms according to
business principles without destroying their ethical and professional commit-
ments."o Some proponents of MDPs even argue that nonlawyer partners have
a strong incentive not to interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment.
Because a lawyer's ineffective or unethical representation damages the
reputation of the firm, the nonlawyer partners stand to lose as much as the
lawyer partners.110 Thus, it is unlikely that nonlawyer partners, who oppo-
nents of MDPs characterize as interested only in profits, would act contrary
to their own financial interests.'1 ' Furthermore, Model Rule 5.4 inadequately
preserves lawyers' professional independence of judgment because it fails to
protect against pressures that other lawyers or employing law firms exert
through billable hour requirements, contingent fee arrangements, pressure to
be placed on nonlawyer partners to protect lawyers' professional judgment, but that restraints
might make MDPs less attractive to nonlawyers).
107. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 16 (arguing that "[i]n reality, nonlawyer-
controlled law firms, which could take the form of private entities with nonlawyer ownership
or publicly traded corporations, would be in the business of providing legal services and would
succeed only by providing sound legal judgment to consumers, as is the case now"); Andrews,
supra note 49, at 602 (arguing that opponents of MDPs presuppose "that the profit motive is
bound to lead to inadequate or unethical legal services").
108. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 16 (noting lack of empirical evidence for
MDP opponents' contention that profit motive is unhealthy for legal profession); Andrews,
supra note 49, at 602 (same).
109. See Bumele V. Powell, Flightfrom the Center: IsIt Just or JustAbout Money?, 84
MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1457-58 (2000) (arguing that "legal profession has long recognized that
the risk to lawyer independence does not arise from the structure of the practice, but from
situations where '[a] non-lawyer has the right to direct or control the professionaljudgment of
a lawyer'); see also Schneyer, supra note 25, at 1498. Schneyer stated:
If companies can be left to their own devices in guarding against internal interfer-
ence with house counsel's judgment on their behalf, they can be expected to
monitor MDPs to discourage lay interference with the lawyers working on their
matters, just as they use house counsel to monitor the outside law firms they retain.
Id.
110. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 16 (arguing that nonlawyers "would be
acting to their own detriment by interfering with the professional independence and judgment
of a firm's lawyer-employees, thereby diminishing the quality of legal services offered"); Daniel
R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHL L. REV. 1,20 (1998) (arguing that economic
functions of lawyers and accountants as reputational intermediaries are similar because both
have "strong incentives to develop reputations for honesty and independence").
111. Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 16-17 ("The dynamics of the marketplace
actually militate against the notion that nonlawyer investors would interfere with the lawyer's
professional independence and judgment").
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reach desired results in opinion letters, and suggested referrals that may not
be in the client's best interest."
2
Second, there is no reason to assume that members ofthe legal profession
are paradigms of ethics and virtue who are not motivated to make money in
the same way as nonlawyers." 3 There is nothing about the legal profession
that prevents lawyers from becoming entirely preoccupied with making money
any more than there is something about nonlegal professions that prevents
them from pursuing purposes other than making money." 4 In fact, within the
last generation, a number of law firms, especially big firms, shifted their
emphasis to moneymaking."n One scholar noted that the legal culture of
today, unlike that of past generations, not only tolerates openness about
money, "but actively encourages lawyers to be more and more exclusively
preoccupied with it."16 Given these changes in the practice of law, "there is
112. James W. Jones & Bayless Manning, Getting at the Root of Core Values: A 'Wadi-
cal" Proposal To Extend the Model Rules to Changing Forms ofLegalPractice, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 1159, 1198-99 (2000); see also James W. Jones, Focusing the MDP Debate: Historical
and Practical Perspectives, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 989, 998 (1999) ("[IThe only effective line of
defense for preserving the professional independence of lawyers is the integrity of the individual
lawyer himself.").
113. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 17 (arguing that same desire to make
money motivates both lawyers and nonlawyers); Andrews, supra note 49, at 602 (arguing that
MDP opponents assume nonlawyers form partnerships only to make money, but lawyers form
partnerships for other reasons). But see Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on
Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development and Some Implications for
the Core Values Debate, 84 MNN. L. REV. 1115, 1154 (2000) (suggesting assumption that
lawyers will succumb to pressure from nonlawyers is at odds with fundamental assumption of
lawyer professionalism "that lawyers' professional training and character... are sufficient to
ensure lawyers' adherence to their professional obligations to clients and the public").
114. See Andrews, supra note 49, at 602 (discussing lawyer and nonlawyer motivations
to enter into their respective fields).
115. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAmG IDEALS OF TBE LEGAL
PROFESSION 294-300 (1993) (asserting that primary motivation for most members of legal
profession has become strong desire to make money); NALP FOUND. FOR RESEARCH & EDUC.,
KEEPING THE KEEIERs; STRATEGIES FoR AssoCIATE RETENTION iN TIMES OF ATTRIION 13
(1998) (noting that most law students are attracted to large law firms with high salaries);
Edward A. Adams & Bruce Balestier, As Associates' Pay Increases, 'Going Rate'Becomes
History, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 19, 1996, at 1 (noting that law firm pay levels have increased to point
that going rate is replaced by salary chaos).
116. See KRONMAN, supra note 115, at 295 (noting changes in legal culture that impact
mentality of modem attorney). Kronman argued that this openness is more than just a "candid
acknowledgment of what before was disingenuously concealed." Id. at 296. The last generation
of lawyers' directness concerning their preoccupation with financial profits served to reinforce
the belief that the practice of law was about more than "the mere production of income" and
actually combated "the natural interest that lawyers have always had in making money." Id.
This cultural norm that placed great value on the successful practice of law and do-emphasized
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no reason to suppose that corporations or laymen engage in the 'sordid'
business of making money any more than do traditional law firms." '
Third, the threat that outside pressures exert onthe professional judgment
of lawyers is not unique to MDPs. As Professor Robert Gordon pointed out:
Any and all forms of professional practice are subject to pressures, con-
straints and temptations - pressures form hierarchical superiors or peers,
payment systems or fee arrangements, incentive to career advancement or
financial reward inside firms or in the profession generally - that may to
a greater or lesser extent compromise the exercise of a lawyer's independ-
ent judgment Over the course of this century, the legal profession has
adopted many arrangements and organizational forms for representing
clients and receivingpaymentfor services thatpose conflicts between their
own interests on the one hand and the interests of clients and the public
good on the other. Hourly billing, to take one of many examples, tempts
some lawyers to run the meter, tempts others to shirk on effort, and settle
earlyand low. Such conflicts are unavoidable: No set of arrangements has
ever been or ever will be devised that will entirely remove such pressures
and temptations. The question your Commission has to ask is, Do the
proposed arrangements forlawyers to practice withnonlawyers promiseto
addany significant sources ofpressure, constraint and temptation to those
that already exist? And even [if] the answer to that question should turn
out to be Yes (or Maybe), does the likely cost or risk of adding new
sources of pressure offset the likely benefits of multi-disciplinary prac-
tices?118
Finally, opponents' concern over the effect MDPs will have on a law-
yer's professional judgment assumes that all nonlawyer professionals' sole
motivation for entering into any occupation is money." 9 Nonlawyers enter
into a multitude of occupations every day for reasons other than profit.1
20
"This is not to deny that some nonlawyers will enter the business of law solely
the legal professions' pecuniary aspects certainly affected the way that lawyers acted in practice.
Id. The recent reversal of this norm has removed the counter pressure against the legal profes-
sion's natural preoccupation with profit, causing "the interest in moneymaking... to play a
larger role in defining the aims of professional life." Id. The resulting preoccupation with
money has served to. make the "lawyer-statesmen ideal" less credible than in previous genera-
tions. Id.
117. See Andrews, supra note 49, at 602 (analyzing lawyer and nonlawyer occupation
motivations).
118. Letter from Robert W. Gordon, Professor of Law, Yale Law School, to Sherwin P.
Simmons, Esq., Chair, MDP Commission, at http'/www.abanctorg/cpr/gordon.html (last
visited Sept 16,1999) (copy on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
119. See Andrews, supra note 49, at 602 (arguing that nonlawyers have occupational
motivation other than financial gain).
120. Id.
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 951 (2000)
to make money, but the same can be said of many lawyers entering the busi-
ness.'
21
2. Independence from the Client
As Professor Luban pointed out, opponents on both sides of the MDP
argument have given very little attention to the effect that MDPs will have on
lawyers' ability to maintain their independence from the client.12 2 The preser-
vation of such independence is crucial because it is necessary for lawyers to
fulfill their role in carrying out the negotiation between public values and
private preferences.'2 The argument against MDPs is that lawyers will be
unable to maintain independence from their clients because "the lawyer's role
has to a large degree blended withthose ofpeople" who care "nothing about the
law beyond whatever effect its enforcement may have on his own interests." 12 4
Professor Eleanor Myers suggested that within the context of MDPs, the
market will determine the independence from the client1' s To the extent that
lawyers do-not feel dependent upon a particular client, it is unlikely that their
professional judgment will be compromised by their desire to make the client
happy. 26 Moreover, if lawyers can maintain independence from the client in
the in-house counsel context, they certainly would be able to maintain their
independence in the context of MDPs.'
7
B. Nonlawyers Not Subject to Bar Association Ethical Regulation
Opponents ofMDPs also have emphasizedthat nonlawyers are not subject
to the rules of professional responsibility adopted in each jurisdiction and are
therefore not subject to state court or bar association ethical regulation or con-
trol.12 Because nonlawyers are not subject to the same discipline as lawyers,
121. Id.; see also supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text (discussing development of
legal profession's preoccupation with money over past generation).
122. See Luban, supra note 97, at 842-43 (suggesting that sole focus of scholarship
surrounding MDPs has been on "lawyers' independence from nonlawyers").
123. Id. at 845
124. Id. at 843-44..
125. EleanorW. Myers, xamininglndependence andLoyalty, 72 TEMP. L.REV. 857,865
(1999).
126. Id.
127. See Schneyer, supra note 25, at 1498 ("If companies can be left to their own devices
in guarding against internal interference with house counsel's judgment on their behaf, they can
be expected to monitor MDPs to discourage lay interference with the lawyers working on their
matters.... ").
128. See Andrews, supra note 49, at 600 (acknowledging various objections raised against
combination of lawyers and nonlawyers in partnership offering legal services).
970
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nonlawyers may act with greater impunity, compounding any harm nonlawyer
ethical violations may cause."z Although nonlawyers' ethical violations
would be no more deplorable than lawyers' violations, nonlawyers would
violate the ethical restrictions more frequently because they have no training
in legal ethics and are not subject to disciplinary actions.130
This argument, however, may assume too much because it does not
recognize that remedies, other than state bar regulation, exist to discourage
nonlawyers from engaging in unethical activity.' As one proponent of MDPs
indicated, both lawyers and nonlawyers owe fiduciary duties of care to their
clients for the breach of which they may be civilly liable. 2 For instance, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts states that "one who undertakes to render
services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill
and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in
good standing in similar communities.""' Similarly, most of the duties im-
posed upon lawyers by the various ethical regulations are imposed upon
nonlawyers by the law of contracts, agency, torts, property, evidence, or crim-
inal law.' Because the sanctions for violations of ethical duties imposed by
courts and disciplinary committees are often mild compared to the substantial
judgments awarded to former clients in malpractice actions based on breaches
of fiduciary or other duties, it arguably is not the fear of discipline from the
bar or the courts, but the fear of malpractice actions, that keeps lawyers in
line. 3 ' Furthermore, some nonlegal professions have their own professional
codes of conduct, which impose similar duties upon their members.'36 Thus,
129. See Carson, supra note 100, at 613 (describing one danger of allowing nonlawyers
to enter partnerships with lawyers).
130. See id. (noting argument that nonlawyers lack of legal training would increase
frequency of ethical violations within MDPs).
131. See Andrews, supra note 49, at 603 (arguing that "lack of bar regulation" of non-
lawyer does not mean that "there would be no remedies against nonlawyers who are engaged
in the business of law").
132. See id. at 603-04 (noting that nonlawyers owe fiduciary duties of care to clients).
133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 299A (1965) (establishing standard of care
to measure conduct of those engaged in profession or trade).
134. See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS 49 (1986) (noting that "little is required
of lawyers that is not already required by other law").
135. See Manuel R. Ramos, LegalMalpractice: ReformingLawyers andLaw Professors,
70 TUL. L. REV. 2583, 2601 (1996) (arguing that legal malpractice litigation, despite current
shortcomings, remains predominant method to regulate attorney behavior); Schneyer, supra
note 25, at 1486 (noting that most large law firms are primarily held accountable through civil
liability); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 IIARV. L. REv. 799, 806
(1992) (noting that bar leaders and others have unsuccessfully attempted to separate malpractice
from discipline).
136. Andrews, supra note 49, at 604 (citing CODES OF PROFESSONALRESPONSBILITY (R
Gorlin ed., 1986)).
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nonlawyer professionals who enter into partnerships with lawyers, although
not necessarily subject to disciplinary proceedings by the bar association or
courts, could still be held accountable for their ethical violations through their
own professional codes and the threat of judgments for breach of a duty that
substantive law imposes. 3
Opponents' concerns over the ethical regulation ofnonlawyers are exces-
sive because MDPs do not allow nonlawyers to engage in the practice of
law. 3' Instead, MDPs allow law firms to provide nonlegal services in combi-
nation with legal assistance while continuing to subject nonlawyers to the
unauthorized practice of law prohibitions, which often carry criminal penal-
ties. 39 Because lawyers continue to be subject to the ethical restrictions found
in the disciplinary rules, "nonlawyers would need to respect the lawyers'
ethical duties or they would find themselves without lawyer partners or
employees.".' 40 Thus, both lawyers and nonlawyers would benefit from ensur-
ing that the nonlawyer did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law. 4'
C. Client Confidentiality
Another objection to MDPs that opponents frequently raise involves the
preservation of client confidences. 42 There are two aspects to this concern.
First, opponents fear that nonlawyers in MDPs will gain unnecessary access
to confidential client information.1 43 Second, opponents suggest that non-
137. See id. at 603-04 (analyzing civil liability as remedy to regulate nonlawyer conduct).
138. See id. at 604 (arguing MDPs do not pose significant threat that nonlawyers will
subject public to imposition or fraud because MDPs would retain prohibition against non-
lawyers engaged in unauthorized practice of law).
139. See id. (noting that prohibition against unauthorized practice of law continue to apply
with context of MDPs). Indeed, the ABA recently adopted a resolution to encourage enforce-
ment of laws prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law. See Gregory Pease, ABA Adopts
UnauthorizedPracticeMeasure, Rejects Federal Consumption TaxiKnciplesDAILYTAXREP.
(BNA), Feb. 16, 2000, at G-3 (noting that ABA resolution encourages jurisdictions to aggres-
sively pursue "any apparent violation of their laws prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law").
140. See Andrews, supra note 49, at 604-05 (analyzing nonlawyer incentive to respect
ethical duties of lawyer in MDP partnership).
141. See id. (concluding nonlawyers in MDPs would have incentive not to engage in
unauthorized practice of law).
142. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 19-20 (describing MDP opponents'
concern that nonlawyer partners may compromise sanctity of client confidentiality); Carson,
supra note 100, at 621-22 (analyzing effe t of nonlawyer partnership on preservation of client
confidentiality); Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 78, at 405-06 (noting danger that nonlawyers
will learn client confidences and secrets in MDPs); Richard E. Mickels & Mark L Davies,
Multidisciplinary Practices: Ethical Concerns or Economic Concerns, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Aug. 1999, at 20,21 (examining how MDPs would jeopardize client confidences).
143. See infra notes 145-50 and accompanying text (discussing argument that nonlawyers
in MDPs will gain unnecessary access to confidential client information).
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lawyers maybe required by their own ethical rules to disclose information that
lawyers are required not to disclose.1"
1. Unnecessary Access to Confidential Client Information
The objection that nonlawyers in MDPs will gain unnecessary access to
confidential client information is based on the fear that the lawyer will inad-
vertently or deliberately share confidential client information with nonlawyers
who have no ethical dutyto maintain client confidentiality.141 Model Rule 1.6
allows a lawyer to reveal client confidences only if the client authorizes the
revelation or if such revelation is necessary to represent the client ade-
quately.146 Likewise, Model Code DR 4-101 prohibits a lawyer from divulg-
ing a client's confidences or secrets. 47 Even the District of Columbia Bar
recognized the MDP threat to client confidentiality. In order to deal with this
threat, the D.C. Bar requires all managers and partners in an MDP to abide by
the bar's rules of professional conduct concerning confidentiality' and makes
MDP lawyers responsible for the nonlawyer participants as if the nonlawyers
144. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text (discussing opponents' concern that
nonlawyers may be required to disclose information that lawyers are prohibited from disclosing).
145. See Carson, supra note 100, at 621 (arguing that screening is ineffective to prevent
nonlawyers from jeopardizing client confidences); Gilbert & Lcmpert, supra note 78, at 405
(recognizing serious risk that nonlawyers in MDP will learn client confidences); Morello, supra
note 6, at 229 (same).
146. See MoDEL RULES, supra note 54, Rule 1.6 (discussing lawyer's obligation to keep
client information confidential). Model Rule 1.6 states that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal informa-
tion relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation." Id. Rule 1.6(a).
The comment to Model Rule 1.6 explains that "[l]awyers in a firm may, in the course ofthe firm's
practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has
instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers." Id. Rule 1.6 cmt. 8.
147. See MODEL CODE, supra note 43, DR 4-101 (governing lawyer preservation of
confidences and secrets of clients). DR 4-101(A) defines confidences as "information protected
by the attorney-client privilege" and secrets as "information gained in the professional relation-
ship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embar-
rassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client" Id. DR 4-101(A). Under DR 4-
101(B) a lawyer is prohibited from knowingly revealing client confidences or secrets, using
client confidences or secrets to the disadvantage of the client, or using confidential client
information for the benefit of himself or a third party without the consent of the client after full
disclosure. See id. DR 4-101(13) (listing restrictions on lawyer use of confidential client
information). Finally, DR 4-101(D) states that "[a] lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to
prevent his employees, associates, and others whose services are utilized by him from disclosing
or using confidences or secrets of a client, except that a lawyer may reveal the information
allowed under [another section of the rules] through an employee." Id. DR 4-101(D).
148. See WASHINGTON, D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 15, Rule
5.4(bX2) (requiring all MDP partners and managers to follow D.C. Rules of Professional
Conduct).
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were lawyers. 4 9 Additionally, some opponents fear that nonlawyer partners
in an MDP would demand access to confidential client information to formu-
late business strategies or personal investment plans. 0
Proponents of MDPs argue that tle existing ethical regulations governing
lawyers, the duties that nonlawyer professionals have under substantive bodies
of law, and the professional codes of other professions that impose ethical
regulations on nonlawyers adequately protect client confidences."' Under the
current Model Rules, a client can consent to the disclosure of confidential
information to persons other than the lawyer.' 2 The Model Rules also allow
the lawyer to disclose confidential information when the client implicitly has
authorized the disclosure to carry out the representation. 53 Under the Model
Rules, if a client does not want the lawyer to disclose particular information
to the lawyer's partners or nonlawyer associates, the client can direct the
lawyer not to disclose the information. 54
It also should be noted that the duty of confidentality is not unique to
the Model Code and Model Rules in that other sources of law similarly
require nonlawyers to maintain client confidences. 55 For instance, Model
149. See id. Rule 5.4(bX3) (making lawyers in MDPs responsible for nonlawyer partners).
The comment to D.C. Rule 5.4 states that "[n]onlawyer participants are persons having manage-
rial authority or financial interests in organizations that provide legal services. Within such
organizations, lawyers with financial interests or managerial authority are held responsible for
ethical misconduct by nonlawyer participants about which the lawyers know or reasonably
should know." Id. Rule 5.4 cmt. 5. By contrast, the Kutak Commission attempted to protect
client confidentiality through a provision that simply required "information relating to represen-
tation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6." See Report of the Commission on Evalu-
alon of Professional Standards, supra note 47, at 886-87 (describing Kutak Commission's
Proposed Rule 5.4).
150. See Andrews, supra note 49, at 614 (citing ABA Memorandum, Subject Model Rule
5.4, at 7 (Apr. 22,1987) (unpublished memorandum available fromABA)) (discussing concerns
expressed in 1987 ABA StaffMemorandum regarding Model Rule 5.4).
151. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 20-21 (arguing that there is no reason to
believe that MDPs would create any greater threat to client confidences than traditional law
firns); Andrews, supra note 49, at 614-16 (same); Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 78, at 405-06
(suggesting that attorney's ethical duty of confidentiality may render MDPs unfeasible or
unattractive to private enterprises); Jones & Manning, supra note 112, at 1202-03 (arguing that
many nonlegal professionals already maintain client confidences).
152. See MODEL RuLms, supra note 54, Rule 1.6(a) (prohibiting lawyer from disclosing
confidential information unless client consents to such disclosure after consultation).
153. See id. (allowing disclosure in certain situations); see also Jones & Manning, supra
note 112, at 1202-03 (noting that it is already common for lawyers to share client confidences
with other professionals "when necessary to carry out the purposes of a representation").
154. See MODEL RUES, supra note 54, Rule 1.6 cmt 7 ("A lawyer is impliedly authorized
to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation, except
to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority.").
155. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 46, at 203 ("[A]ll agents have a dutyto treat informa-
tion from and about their principals as confidential to the extent that the principal so intends and
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Rule 1.6, which governs the treatment of client confidences, finds its equiva-
lent in agency law."5 6 An agent, whether lawyer or nonlawyer, is "subject to
a duty to the principal not to use or to commumicate information confiden-
tialy given him by the principal or acquired by him during the course of or
on account of his agency or in violation of his duties as agent."'5 7 Thus,
nonlawyer partners, acting as agents, would owe a duty to clients not to dis-
close confidential information for their own benefit or the benefit of a third
party.5 " Lawyer partners, as principals, would be subject.to liability for
breach of that duty.' 9 Even if agency law's duty of confidentiality is more
limited in scope than the attorney's duty under the ethical regulations govern-
ing the practice of law, nonlawyer professionals still could enter into contrac-
a duty not to use information about the principal against the principal or for the personal gain
of the agent"); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,Foreword The Future of the Profemion, 84 MINN. L.
RrV. 1083, 1093 (2000) (noting that ethical duties of confidentiality, loyally, and competence
are imposed on nonlaycr professionals by agency law and law governing fiduciaries).
156. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958) (stating prohibition against
agent's use or disclosure of client's confidential information).
157. Id.
158. See id. (prohibiting agent from disclosing client confidences "on his own account or
on behalf of another"). The comment to Section 395 states:
To permit an agent to use, for his own benefit or for the benefit of others in compe-
tition with the principal, information confidentially given or acquired by him in the
performance of or because of his duties as agent would tend to destroy the freedom
ofcommunicalion which should exist between the principal and the agent
Id. § 395 cmt a.
159. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958) (explaining liability of princi-
pal for acts of agents). Section 213 states:
A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to lia-
bility for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless:
(a) in giving improper or ambiguous orders of in failing to make proper regula-
tions; or
(b) in the employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in work involving
risk of harm to others:
(c) in the supervision ofthe activity, or
(d) in permitting, or failing to prevent, negligent or other tortious conduct by
persons, whether or not his servants or agents, upon premises or with instrumen-
talities under his control
Id.; see also Connelly v. Special Rd. & Bridge Dist. No. 5, 126 So. 794, 797 (Fla. 1930) (stating
general rule of agency law that "servant who, without his master's knowledge and sanction,
procures from a transaction in which he is acting as his master's agent a personal advantage not
provided for, nor contemplated by the contract of hiring, is guilty of a breach of duty"); More
v. Burroughs, 205 P. 1029,1031 (Kan. 1922) (recognizing rule that agent cannot use informa-
tion acquired by him while acting on behalf of principal for agent's own personal advantage);
Bell v. Bell, 3 W. Va. 183, 185 (1869) (finding one who acquired information while acting as
agent liable to principal for profit made by purchase and sale based on such information).
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tual agreements that subject them to liability for failure to maintain client
confidences.160 Furthermore, as principals of their nonlawyer agents, lawyers
are liable to their clients for any nonlawyer agent's breach of the lawyer's
duty of confidentiality.1 61
Finally, several existing professional rules would continue to protect client
confidences within an MDP.162 Model Rule 5.3 requires lawyers to make
certain that nonlawyer employees comply with the lawyers' professional obli-
gations. 63 Similarly, Model Rule 8.4(a) would serve to protect a client's con-
fidences in an MDP by prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly assisting another
person to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or violating those Rules
160. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 20 (noting that "almost all professional
service agreements between investment banks and their clients include a strict confidentiality
clause"); Andrews, supra note 49, at 615-16 (arguing that under traditional agency law princi-
ples nonlawyer professionals possess freedom to contractually agree to expanded duty of con-
fidentiality).
161. See In re Estate of Divine, 635 N.E.2d 581, 587 (1l. App. Ct. 1994) (recognizing
attorney liability in malpractice or as ethical violation for acts of paralegal); Lane v. Williams,
521 A.2d 706, 708 (Me. 1987) (finding lawyer responsible for secretary's failure to file notice
of appeal prior to deadline even though lawyer instructed secretary to do so); Musselman v.
Willoughby Corp., 337 S.E.2d 724, 728 (Va. 1985) (concluding lawyer's failure to disclose
crucial language necessary to client understanding of contract provision and lawyer's employ-
ment of untrained paralegal to formulate final documents and to play significant role in closing
real estate transaction violated attorney's duty to client); RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M.
SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 5.8, at 379 (4th ed. 1996) (stating that lawyer is "responsible
for the efficiency and conduct of employed ... office staff').
162. See Andrews, supra note 49, at 616 (exploring rules of professional conduct that
protect client confidentiality in MDP context).
163. See MODEL RULES, supra note 54, Rule 53 (explaining responsibilities of lawyers
regarding nonlawyer assistants). Model Rule 5.3 provides:
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a
lawyer:
(a) a partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm
has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's con-
duct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer,
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with
the professional obligations of the lawyer, and
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a
violation of the rules of professional conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if.
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of specific conduct, ratifies
the conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the person is employed,
or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the
conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated
but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
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'"through the acts of another."h"ss In addition, a number of the ethical regula-
tions of nonlawyer professions require nonlawyer professionals to maintain
client confidences.
165
2. Nonlawyers Duty to Disclose Client Information
Another concern is that "a nonlawyer in an MDP may be subject to an
obligation of disclosure that is inconsistent with the lawyer's obligation of
confidentiality." 166 For instance, although the rules exempt lawyers from the
confidentiality requirement only to prevent imminent death or serious bodily
harm, accountants must waive client confidentiality in order to filfill their
attest function. 67 In fact, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
recently has taken the position that auditors and lawyers in the same firm
cannot represent the same client at the same time."e Apparently, the SEC is
164. See id. Rule 8.4(a) (describing what constitutes professional misconduct under Rules
of Professional Responsibility).
165. See Rule 301 of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., Rules
of Conduct and the Code of Professional Ethics, reprinted in CODES OF PROFsSIONAL REsPoN-
SIBILY 16-17 (R. Gorlin od., 4th ed. 1999) ("A member in public practice shall not disclose
any confidential client information without the specific consent of the client"); Society of
Financial Service Professionals, Code of Ethics, Guide 1.2, reprinted in CODES OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBIIY, supra, at 183 ("A member shall respect the confidential relationship
existing between client and member.").
166. See Commission onMultidisciplinaryPractice: Report, supra note 95, 14-15 (dis-
cussing client confidentiality concerns involving MDPs). For example, mental health care
workers in cases of suspected child abuse and accountants performing the attest or audit function
have different disclosure obligations than lawyers under the Model Rules. See id. 15 (listing
specific examples of lawyers and nonlawyers having inconsistent disclosure obligations).
167. See Fox, supra note 103, at 1102 (arguing that accounting profession's notion of
confidentiality bears little resemblance to that of legal profession). Professor Painter provided
a succinct description of auditors' duty to disclose information to the SEC. See Richard W.
Painter, Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the Psychology of Concealment, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 1399,1411-13 (2000) (discussing auditors' duty to disclose).
168. See Letter from Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, to Sherwin P. Simmons, Chair of the American Bar Association Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice, at http'/www.abanetorgcpr/tumer.html (last visited Sept 13, 2000)
("OCA would consider a firm's independence from an SEC registrant to be impaired if that firm
also provides legal advice to the registrant or its affiliates.") (copy on file with Washington and
Lee Law Review). The SEC is not the only one taking this position. A number of scholars,
even those supporting MDPs, do not believe that MDPs should be permitted to simultaneously
provide the same client with audit and legal services. See Carol A. Needham, Pernitting
Lawyers To Participate in Multidisciplinary Practices: Business as Usual or the End of the
Profession as We Know It?, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2000) (arguing that IDP firms
should not provide legal services and audit services to the same client); Laurel S. Terry, German
MDPs: Lessons to Learn, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1547,1616-17 (2000) (arguing that MDPs should
not be permitted to deliver legal and audit services to same client).
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concerned that the lawyers' duty of confidentiality will affect auditors' inde-
pendence when determining what information must be disclosed.'69 Similarly,
opponents of MDPs fear that the auditors' duty to disclose will jeopardize
lawyers' duty of confidentiality.1 0
The Commission on MDPs suggested that MDPs could alleviate these
concerns by the construction of "firewalls" between the lawyers and auditors,
which would allow each of the professions to continue to operate according
to its own rules."' However, the "firewall" approach is inadequate for several
reasons. First, a "firewall" will only delay a lawyer's revelation of client
information to the auditor until the auditor makes a request for such informa-
tion.1 2 Second, 't he lawyers may expose themselves to substantial liability
for participating in the client's concealment if they do not resign from the
representation.' 1 3 Finally, the "firewall" approach fails to address the SEC's
concern that lawyers' duty of confidentiality will impair auditors' independent
judgment in determining what must be disclosed. 74
Scholars have suggested a second approach, which would require lawyers
in MDPs to "obtain client consent to their sharing with auditors practicing
within their fim any information that is material to the audit."'1 5  This ap-
proach would alleviate the SEC's concern by making the relevant information
that is known to the lawyers credited to the auditors. 76 Furthermore, only
169. See Painter, supra note 167, at 1400 (suggesting that SEC's position is based on fear
that lawyers will inhibit auditors' independence).
170. See Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 4, 1999)
(written remarks of Lawrence 1. Fox, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP), at http//www.abanet.org/
cpr/fox2.html (arguing that MDPs will abrogate confidentiality "for some lawyers because they
work for those with a duty to disclose") (copy on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
171. See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, American EarAss'n, Recommenda-
ion: Appendix A Rule 5.8, cmt 3 (1999), at httpJwww.abanetorglpr/mdpappendixa.html
("[11t may be necessary for an MDP to implement special procedures to protect confidential
information such as building firewalls in the firm's computer information system, restricting
access to client files.. ., and physically separating the lawyers and their nonlawyer assistants,
paralegals, and secretaries from other service units within the MDP.") (copy on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review).
172. Painter, supra note 167, at 1429. "The lawyer can refuse to provide the information,
and must refuse if the client so requests, but this would likely lead the auditors to resign." Id.
at 1410.
173. Id. at 1429.
174. Id.
175. Id.; see also Andrews, supra note 49, at 615 (suggesting that lawyers in MDPs should
presume client who seeks representation from MDP has "consented to disclosure of information
to nonlawyer associates at the outset of the relationship, to the extent necessary to carry out the
representation").
176. See id. at 1430 ("The SEC will probably never agree to permit one firm to provide
both auditing and legal services to the same client unless information known to the lawyers
about the client is legally attributable to the auditors.").
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clients who wish to receive legal and auditing services from the same firm
need to consent to such a waiver."7 Some clients might find such a waiver
attractive as a way of indicating to regulators and investors that they have
nothing to hide. 78
In opposition to the waiver approach, Lawrence Fox argued that "the duty
of confidentiality is not waiveable for the benefit of the lawyer and, even if it
were, a prospective waiver would be void since by definition it could never
be knowing and intelligent."179 However, this argument failed to consider that
a waiver of confidentiality would be to the benefit of the clients because it
enables them to obtain audit and legal services more efficiently than if they
had to engage separate firms."' Furthermore, most clients requiring both legal
and auditing services "are sophisticated enough to decide for themselves
whether prospective waiver is appropriate." ' Fox also failed to cite any
authority for the proposition that an ex ante waiver of confidentiality would
be void.18 Finally, Fox did not explain how the "concealment of information
from auditors" represents a core value of the legal profession."8 3
D. Attorney-Client Privilege
Related to, but separate from the issue of client confidentiality, is the
concern that MDPs run the risk of violating or failing to preserve the attorney-
client privilege.'" MDPs could violate the attorney-client privilege in two
177. Id.
178. See id. at 1430-31(arguing that waiver of confidentiality will be attractive to some
clients who wish to reassure third parties that they have nothing to hide).
179. Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 4,1999) (written
remarks of Lawrence . Fox, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP), at http't/www.abanetorgcpr/foxl.
html. (copy on file with Washington and Le Law Review).
180. See Painter, supra note 167, at 1432 (noting that Fox fails to consider that clients
might benefit by waiving confidentiality protections); see also Eleanor W. Myers, Examining
Independence andLoyalty, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 857, 866 (2000) ("[Slince loyalty is an obligation
owed to the client, in many situations the client is in the best position to determine whether it
might be impaired by the lawyer's other obligations or whether the client desires to trade off
potential impairment of loyalty in favor of other concerns.").
181. Painter, supra note 167, at 1432; see also Luban, supra note 97, at 840 ("But we are
talking primarily about very sophisticated business clients who will know better than the ABA
does whether they are being well-served by their lawyers.").
182. Painter, supra note 167, at 1432.
183. See id. ("Fox does not explain why concealment of information from auditors, partic-
ularly information that could concern client fraud and illegal acts, should be included among
the profession's 'most cherished' values, or a public policy reason why prospective waiver of
secrecy by a public company should be void.").
184. See Carson, supra note 100, at622 (discussing concernthatMDPsjeopardize attorney-
client privilege); John D. Conners, Comment, Law Firm Diversification: An Affront to Profes-
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ways. First, nonlawyer partner involvement may destroy the attorney-client
privilege if the nonlawyer's assistance is not necessary to represent the client
adequately. 85 Second, a nonlawyer partner might not treat legal matters in the
manner necessary to preserve the attorney-client privilege.'86 Additionally,
opponents fear that MDPs will inhibit clients from divulging all information
surrounding their representation to an attorney because the client has no
guarantee that the attorney will prevent nonlawyer partners from waiving the
attorney-client privilege.
8 7
It is true that, by increasing the frequency of interaction between clients
and nonlawyers, MDPs will increase opportunities for waiving the attorney-
client privilege. However, MDPs will not increase the risk that lawyers will
inadvertently destroy the privilege by disclosing privileged information to
nonlawyer partners. Under existing law, a lawyer may disclose privileged
information to nonlawyer experts and professionals without destroying the
privilege if the nonlawyer is an agent ofthe lawyer who facilitates the represen-
tation.s Thus, to preserve the privilege, the law already requires the lawyer to
ensure that only agents who facilitate representation have access to privileged
sionalism?, 17 OnIO N.U. L. REV. 303, 314-15 (1990) (noting MDPs may threaten attorney-
client privilege); Commission onMulddisciplinaryPractice: Report, supra note 95, 16 (recog-
nizing attorney-client privilege argument against allowing MDPs).
185. See Carson, supra note 100, at 622 (exploring potential negative impact of MDP on
attorney-client privilege); see also United States v. Melvin, 650 FId 641, 646 (5th Cir. 1981)
(observing that "there is no confidentiality when disclosures are made in the presence of a
person who has not joined the defense team, and with respect to whom there is no reasonable
expectation of confidentiality"); Bolyea v. First Presbyterian Church, 196 N.W.2d 149, 154
(N.D. 1972) (recognizing general rule that attorney-client conversation is not privileged when
client openly converses with attorney in presence and hearing of third parties); 8 WIGMoRE,
EVIDENCE § 2311, at 601-02 ("One of the circumstances by which it is commonly apparent that
the communication is not confidential is the presence ofa third person who is not the agent of
either client or attorney.").
186. See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice: Report, supra note 95, 116 (describ-
ing how MDPs might threaten attorney-client privilege and discussing Commission's recom-
mendations).
187. See Conners, supra note 184, at 314-15 (exploring potential client reluctance to
provide full disclosure to attorney in MDP).
188. SeeRESTATEMENT(THID)OFTHELAWGOVERNNCGLAWYER5§118(ProposedFmal
Draft No. 1, 1996) ('[T]he attorney-client privilege may be invoked as provided in § 135 with
respect to: (1) a communication (2) made between privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for
the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client"). Section 120 of the Re-
statement provides that "[p]rivileged persons within the meaning of § 118 are the client (including
a prospective client), the client's lawyer, agents of either who facilitate communications between
them, and agents of the lawyer who facilitate the representation." Id. § 120. This "privilege also
extends to communications to and from the client that are disclosed to independent contractors
retained by a lawyer, such as an accountant or physician retained by the lawyer to assist in
providing legal services to the client and not for the purpose oftestifying." Id. § 120 crat. g.
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information.189 Although a lawyer "generally has implied authority to disclose
confidential client communications inthe course of representing a client,"1the
privilege may still apply when a lawyer discloses privileged information in
clear violation of the lawyer's confidentiality obligation.91 Furthermore,
numerous cases demonstrate that lawyers already must take strong precautions
to prevent clients from divulging privileged information when interacting with
anyone not required to effectuate representation." In fact, MDPs are likelyto
decrease the incidences of inadvertent waiver of attorney-client privilege
because lawyers working in MDPs constantly will be aware of the need for
candor and secrecy when discussing privileged information.
Similarly, lawyers would not allow nonlawyer partners to treat privileged
information in a manner that would fail to preserve the privilege. As agents
of the lawyer, nonlawyer partners who effectively waive the attorney-client
privilege by disclosing confidential client information would subject the
lawyer to liability for breach of duty of confidentiality.'9 Given the liability
that lawyers face for negligently allowing attomey-client privileges to be
waived, lawyers in MDPs certainly would set up procedures to prevent such
information from being disclosed and to protect the privilege. Thus, there is
little reason to believe that a client of an MDP would hold back information
from the attorney for fear that he would not maintain the privilege.
189. See id. § 120 cmt a ("[A] lawyer should allow a non-client to participate only upon
clarifying that person's role and when it reasonably appears that the benefit of that person's
presence offsets the risk of a later claim that the presence of a third person forfeited the
privilege.").
190. See id. § 129 cmt c (discussing authorized disclosure of confidential information).
191. See United States v. Sindona, 636 F.2d 792, 804-05 (2d Cir. 1980) (affirming lower
court ruling precluding cross-examination of witness based upon material obtained from
witness's attorney in violation of attorney-client privilege); State v. Maxwell, 691 P.2d 1316,
1320 (Kan. Ct App. 1984) (finding attorney-client privilege applicable when lawyer, without
authorization from clients, disclosed damaging and otherwise privileged communications to
opposing party's lawyer in clear breach of confidentiality obligation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERING LAWYERS, supra note 188, § 129 cmt c ("Upon discovery of an
agents' wrongful disclosure, the client must promptly take reasonable steps to suppress or
recover the wrongfully-disclosed communication in order to preserve the privilege.").
192. See In re Scaled Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[I]f a client wishes to
preserve the privilege, it must treat the confidentiality of attorney-client communications like
jewels - if not crown jewels."); United States v. Landot 591 F.2d 36, 39 (9th Cir. 1978)
(finding no privilege for statements uttered in presence of third person who was lawyer but was
not acting as counsel at that time); United States v. Gangi, 1 F. Supp. 2d 256, 263 (SD.N.Y.
1998) ("Even privileged documents, however, are not protected if a party voluntarily discloses
them."); Fry v. McCall, No. 95CIV.1915, 1998 WL 273035, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1998)
(explaining that gross negligence may justify finding that disclosure was intentional).
193. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (noting that lawyers are liable to their
clients for any nonlawyer agent's breach of lawyer's duty of confidentiality).
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E. Conflicts ofinterest
Opponents also argue that MDPs create potential conflicts of interest
problems.'94 The most obvious conflict that MDPs create is the tension
between an attorney's duty to promote his clients' best interests and the
attorney's obligation to advance the business interests of the nonlawyer
partners inthe firm or corporation."9 For example, such a conflict may occur
when a lawyer feels pressured to refer a client to nonlawyer professionals in
the same firm even though the client's best interests would require the lawyer
to recommend a non-partner professional."s Another example is that a part-
nership between a law firm and a consulting firm may create a situation in
which a lawyer is reluctant 'to inform his client that the law firm's consulting
group simply provided bad advice."'" Finally, a situation could arise in which
the interests of a lawyer's client are in conflict with the interest of a nonlegal
client who has come to the nonlawyer partners for assistance."
The fear that lawyers in MDPs will make inappropriate internal referrals
is unfounded for two reasons. First, clients who take advantage of MDPs will
be aware of the partnership between the lawyer and the nonlawyer. In fact,
clients are likely to choose an MDP for the benefit of having a single provider
address both the legal and nonlegal issues involved in representation!" Thus,
clients will be aware that MDPs involve the same collective interest among
partners that is seen in other partnership arrangements. 2" Second, a lawyer
194. See Carson, supra note 100, at 618 (arguing that conflicts of interest are most serious
ethical problem associated with MDPs); Conners, supra note 184, at 315 (noting that MDPs
create potential conflicts of interest problems); Morello, supra note 6, at 226-27 (discussing
conflicts of interest argument against MDPs).
195. See Carson, supra note 100, at 618 (describing type of conflict most likely to arise in
MDPs). Additionally, a lawyer could obtain information from a non-client customer of the
firm's nonlawyer associates that would be beneficial in the representation of the lawyer's client,
thus creating a conflict between the lawyer's obligation to clients and obligations to third-party
consumers. See Conners, supra note 184, at 315 (suggesting possible conflict stemming from
attorney participation in MDP).
196. See Morello, supra note 6, at 226 (noting example of conflict of interest opponents
offer against MDPs).
197. See Conners, supra note 184, at 315 (explaining how MDPs could create conflict of
interest for lawyers or law firms).
198. See id. (suggesting that lawyer could obtain "confidential information from a non-
client customer" that would be beneficial to representation of client, "thus creating a potentially
serious collision between that lawyer's obligations to clients and obligations to third-party
consumers - a classic conflict of interest").
199. See infra notes 267-70 and accompanying text (discussing how MDPs offer benefit
of increased efficiency in representation).
200. The threat of inappropriate internal referrals already exists in traditional law firms.
For instance, any time a lawyer is presented with a case that requires particular expertise in an
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subjects himself to malpractice actions for fraud when he knowingly refers a
client to a nonlawyer partner who is incapable of adequately representing the
client's needs. °1
Although the formation of large MDPs would increase the potential for
conflicts of interest,2° the fear that a lawyer in an MDP will represent a client
with interests that conflict with the interests of a nonlawyer partner or a client
of a nonlawyer partner fails to consider the ethical restrictions the Model
Rules and the Model Code currently place on lawyers.0 3 Model Rule 1.7
prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if the lawyer's own interests or
responsibilities to a third party may adversely affect representation of the
client, unless the client consents and the lawyer reasonably believes that the
client's representation will not be adversely affected.2' The Model Rules also
prohibit a lawyer from knowingly acquiring an interest adverse to a client
unless the transaction is fair to the client, the client has an opportunity to seek
the advice of independent counsel, and the client consents to the transaction.2 5
unfamiliar area of the law, there is the risk that the lawyer will refer the client to a partner who
is knowledgeable in that area even though the client would be best served by a lawyer who is
not a member of the firm.
201. See RONALD E. MAllEN & VICTOR B. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 107-08 (1977)
(noting that "[w]hen committed by an attorney, the tort of fraud ... is determined by ... a false
and material representation knowingly made by the attorney with the intent to deceive the client,
who justifiably relied upon the representations which proximately caused damage").
202. See Jones & Manning, supra note 112, at 1201 ("[it is likely that a combination of
a large law firm and a large accounting firm would produce more potential conflict situations
than either organization would have separately, but that would be more the result of 'bigness'
than of the multidisciplinary nature of the combined practice.").
203. See MODEL RULES, supra note 54, Rule 1.8 (outlining transactions prohibited by
conflicts of interest rule); MODEL CODE, supra note 43, DR 5-101(A), DR 5-104(A) (prohibit-
ing lawyer from representing client with interest in conflict with lawyers own interest or interest
of another client, unless clients consent).
204. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 54, Rule 1.7(b) (outlining conflict of interest rule).
Model Rule 1.7(b) states:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include ex-
planation of the implications of the common representation and the advan-
tage and risks involved.
Id.
205. See id. Rule 1.8(a) (describing transactions prohibited by conflicts of interest restric-
tions). Model Rule 1.8(a) states:
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Similarly, the Model Code forbids a lawyer from representing a client without
the client's informed consent when the lawyer has any interest that might
affect the lawyer's professional judgment."° Additionally, the Model Code
prohibits a lawyer from entering into a business transaction with a client if the
lawyer represents the client in the transaction, unless the client consents after
receiving full disclosure from the lawyer.2'o
Other ethical regulations apply the conflicts of interest restrictions
collectively against lawyers whom are associated together in a firm.2°s Model
Rule 1.10 imputes the disqualification of one lawyer to the entire law firm
when the disqualification is due to a prohibited conflict of interest.209 Model
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a
client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair
and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in
writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the
client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advise of independ-
ent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
Id.
206. See MODEL CODE, supra note 43, DR 5-101(A) (forbidding lawyer from representing
client if lawyer's professional judgment is compromised). Model Code DR 5-101(A) states that
"[e]xcept with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employ-
ment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably
may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests." Id.
207. See id. DR 5-104(A) (prohibiting lawyer from engaging in self-dealing). Model Code
DR 5-104(A) states that "[a] lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if
they have differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise his profes-
sional judgment therein for the protection of the client, unless the client has consented after full
disclosure." Id.
208. See MODEL RULES, supra note 54, Rule 1.10 (imputing conflicts of interest restric-
tions to all lawyers associated in same firm); MODEL CODE, supra note 43, DR 5-105(D)
(prohibiting partners and associates from representing client that lawyer is disqualified from
representing).
209. See MODEL RULES, supra note 54, Rule 1.10 (disqualifying all members of firm when
conflicts of interest restriction disqualifies one member). Model Rule 1.10 states:
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent
a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing
so by [Model Rules governing conflicts of interests].
(b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not
prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially
adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and
not currently represented by the firm, unless:
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly
associated lawyer represented the client; and
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Code DR 5-105(D) also prohibits any member of a law firm from representing
a client that one partner is disqualified from representing. ° Courts and ethics
committees have held that the regulations imputing one partner's conflict of
interest to all members of the firm apply equally in the case of nonlawyer
employees of a firm.2 ' Thus, the logical inference is that courts and ethics
committees would also extend the imputation of a lawyer's conflict of interest
to a nonlawyer partner, thereby prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client
when the client's interests are in conflict with the interests of a nonlawyer or
a nonlawyer's client. A regulation that imputes conflicts of interests only for
clients who purchase legal services from MDPs would be inadequate because
many MDP lawyers would continue the current practice of providing legal
services and calling it consulting in order to bypass the regulation." 2 One
scholar believed that "[i]f conflicts are imputed to other persons working in
an MDP, the magnitude of business lost due to the imposition of the new
conflicts standards is likely to lead management... to pressure attorneys
working in those organizations to resign their law licenses.'o213 However, if
large numbers of lawyers began resigning their licenses, both the organized
bar and the courts would begin strictly to enforce the unauthorized practice of
law prohibitions.
(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6
and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter.
(c) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client
under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
Id.
210. See MODEL CODE, supra note 43, DR 5-105(D) (applying conflicts of interest of one
partner collectively against entire law firm). Model Code DR 5-105(D) states that "[i]f a lawyer
is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule,
no partner or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm may accept or
continue such employment" Id.
211. See Kapo Mfg. Co. v. C&O Enters., 637 F. Supp. 1231, 1236 (N.D. MI1. 985)
(applying disqualification analysis used in cases involving attorney conflicts of interest to
situation in which secretary-office manager switched sides during litigation); Ethics Comm. of
the Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility of the Tennessee Supreme Court, Formal Op. 110 (1987) ("A
lawyer may not represent a client in a case when the lawyer's paralegal was previously em-
ployed by the opposing party's law firm and the paralegal had such duties in his former
employment as interviewing clients and reviewing and monitoring files, unless all parties
consent after full disclosure."); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op.
1526 (1988) ("Circumstances sometimes require that a firm be disqualified or withdraw [sic]
from representing a client when the firm employs a nonlawyer who formerly was employed by
another firm.").
212. Needham, supra note 168, at 1354; see also Terry, supra note 168, at 1620 (suggest-
ing that amount of information shared between lawyers and nonlawyers in German MDPs
supports imputation of conflicts to all members of MDPs).
213. Needham, supra note 168, at 1355.
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F Unauthorized Practice of Law
Opponents of MDPs also fear that they will lead to the unauthorized
practice of law.214 Although nonlawyer managers or interest holders are
unlikely to be interested in giving legal advice to clients of their law firms, the
fear is that individual nonlawyer partners will engage, either intentionally or
inadvertently, in the unauthorized practice of law.? The difficulty is that the
definition of the, "practice of law" varies from jurisdiction to jurisditin.
216
For example, some jurisdictions consider the preparation of escrow documents
for a real estate transaction to be a function exclusively within the competency
of a lawyer, but other jurisdictions consider nonlawyer realtors competent to
perform such a taskY One critic suggested that "[tihe difficultly lies with
services that combine lawyer and lay fuctions or that do not clearly fall with-
in the lawyer's exclusive domain."2 " Such services create problems because
a client who receives advice in a law office in relation to such a service is
more likely to expect an accurate legal opinion, even if a nonlawyer is giving
the advice.
219
214. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 21-23 (noting that MDP opponents
contend MDPs will increase risk of unauthorized practice of law and arguing that such conten-
tions are unfounded); Andrews, supra note 49, at 578-84 (discussing nonlegal corporations that
offer legal services and thus violate prohibitions against unauthorized practice of law); Carson,
supra note 100, at 615-17 (arguing that partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers will lead
to unauthorized practice of law); Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 78, at 404-05 (arguing that
MDP nonlawyer investors or managers would not necessarily lead to increased risk of unautho-
rized practice of law).
215. See Carson, supra note 100, at 615 (explaining how MDPs may result in nonlawyers
engaging in unauthorized practice of law).
216. See MODEL RULES, supra note 54, Rule 5.5 (prohibiting unauthorized practice of
law); MODEL CODE, supra note 43, DR 3-101 (prohibiting lawyer from aiding unauthorized
practice of law). The comment to Model Rule 5.5 states that "[tihe definition of the practice of
law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another." MODEL RULES, supra
note 54, Rule 5.5 cmt Likewise, EC 3-5 of the Model Code states that "[it is neither necessary
nor desirable to attempt the formulation of a single, specific definition of what constitutes the
practice of law." MODEL CODE, supra note 43, EC 3-5.
217. See Melvin F. Adler, Are Real Estate Agents Entitled to Practice a Little Law?, 4
ARiz. L. R V. 188, 191-94 (1963) (discussing how number ofjurisdictions address preparation
of escrow documents).
218. See Carson, supra note 100, at 616 (arguing that partnership between lawyers and
nonlawyers will lead to unauthorized practice of law).
219. See id. (explaining how services that combine legal and lay functions create diffi-
culties); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 257 (1994)
(noting that public should be able to distinguish lawyers from nonlawyers). Formal Opinion
257 states:
it is essential that the public should know who are lawyers and who are laymen,
because the privilege - not the right - to practice is granted to lawyers only after
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Critics also argue that nonlawyer partners intentionally will engage in the
unauthorized practice oflaw2 0 For instance, a California lawyer encountered
such a situation when he entered into a partnership with a nonlawyer insur-
ance agent to practice personal injury law." The nonlawyer insurance agent
was responsible for interviewing and screening out potential clients and pre-
paring legal documents for the approval of the lawyer.'m Upon discovering
that the nonlawyer had been soliciting cases, preparing legal documents,
forging the lawyer's signature, and settling cases without the lawyer's ap-
proval, the lawyer turned himself in to the State Bar Discipline Committee.'
Because the firm's clients were mostly immigrants and because none of the
clients had complained, it is unlikely that the California State Bar Association
would have ever discovered the violation if the lawyer had not voluntarily
stepped forward.24 In the same manner, MDPs create the risk that the unau-
thorized practice of law will occur unnoticed unless the parties involved
disclose the violation.2'
Critics argue that the temptation to engage in the unauthorized practice
of law will be even greater for nonlawyer partners who have had legal train-
ing.2 6 This criticism contemplates that individuals with legal training, but
who lack a license to practice, like law school graduates who fail to pass the
bar exam or practicing attorneys who are disbarred, will be tempted to put
their legal training to use.27 Because the standard for unauthorized practice
they have met the tests of character and learning which have been imposed for the
protection of the public by statute or rule.
Id.
220. See Carson, supra note 100, at 616-17 (examining temptation of nonlawyer partners,
especially those with legal training, to intentionally engage in unauthorized practice of law).
221. See In re Francis E. Jones I 2 Cal. St Bar Rptr. 411, 416 (1993) (holding that
attorney violated California Rules of Professional Conduct by forming partnership with non-
lawyer and allowing nonlawyer to retain clients and settle cases).
222. See id. at 417 (describing responsibilities assigned to nonlawyer partner under part-
nership agreement with lawyer).
223. See id. (recounting lawyer's voluntary disclosure of ethical violations to State Bar
Discipline Committee).
224. See Carson, supra note 100, at 617 (emphasizing that MDPs create risks that unautho-
rized practice of law will occur unless parties involved voluntarily disclose such unauthorized
practice).
225. See id. (emphasizing that MDPs create risks that unauthorized practice of law will
occur unless parties involved voluntarily disclose such unauthorized practice).
226. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 22-23 (arguing that this criticism is
unfounded because rules require lawyers to be responsible for nonlawyers); Carson, supra note
100, at 617 (asserting that nonlawyer who has had legal training runs greatest risk of violating
Model Rule 5.5).
227. See Carson, supra note 100, at 617 (explaining why nonlawyer partners with legal
training would run greater risk of engaging in unauthorized practice of law).
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is vague,tm it is unlikely that nonlawyer partners, not to mention clients, will
realize that the nonlawyer partners have crossed the line denoting unautho-
rized practice of law.'m Because paralegals, legal secretaries, and other
nonlawyers all have legal knowledge that they could abuse, "[i]t would be
difficult to defend a rule which would deny law firm partnership to individuals
because they possess legal knowledge and grant law firm partnership to
individuals because they do not."'2
The existing ethical standards and regulations already provide for almost
every possible situation that an MDP might face regarding the unauthorized
practice of law."3 Traditional law firms employ a number of types of non-
lawyers such as secretaries, paralegals, investigators, and bookkeepers who are
prohibited from taking actions that might constitute the practice of law.232 The
Model Rules make lawyers responsible for the violations of their nonlawyer
employees.3 Model Rule 5.3(b) requires a lawyer to supervise nonlawyer
employees to ensure that such employees do not violate the lawyer's profes-
sional obligations. 4 Model Rule 5.3(c) holds a lawyer responsible for the
conduct of a nonlawyer employee that violates the Rules of Professional Con-
duct if the lawyer knowingly approves ofthe conduct or knows of the conduct
at a time when the consequences could be avoided and fails to take remedial
action3 5 Furthermore, the Model Rules prohibit a lawyer from assisting
nonlawyers in the unauthorized practice of law." 6 If nonlawyer employees
and assistants can work within law firms without engaging inthe unauthorized
practice of law, there is reason to believe that nonlawyer partners and profes-
228. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (noting that definition of unauthorized
practice of law varies from state to state).
229. See Carson, supra note 100, at 617 (discussing difficulty of policing nonlawyer part-
ners to prevent unauthorized practice of law from occurring).
230. See id. (noting that limiting nonlawyer partnership to only individuals with no legal
training seems unfair and does not solve unauthorized practice problem).
231. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 22-23 (arguing that "[1]awyers would
continue to practice law while other professionals would continue to avoid unauthorized prac-
tice of law").
232. See id. at 21-22 (noting that most traditional law firms employ nonlawyera who sue-
cessfully avoid practicing law).
233. See MODEL RULES, supra note 54, Rule 53(b)-(c) (outlining lawyer's professional
responsibility regarding nonlawyer assistants)-
234. See id. Rule 53(b) (requiring lawyer to supervise nonlawyer employee's conduct).
235. See id. Rule 5.3(c) (describing lawyer's responsibility for conduct of nonlawyer
employees).
236. See id. Rule 5.5(b) (prohibiting lawyer from assisting anyone in unauthorized practice
of law). Specifically, Rule 5.5(b) states that a lawyer shall not "assist a person who is not a
member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of
law." Id.
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sionals would be able to do so 7
The Model Rules also protect against the possibility that MDPs will
afford law school graduates who fail to pass the bar and disbarred lawyers an
opportunity to practice law without a license because the rules making lawyers
responsible for such illicit nonlawyer activity are equally applicable to all
nonlawyers.35 It is also unlikely that many lawyers would engage in this type
of violation because few would be interested in obtaining the services of an
individual who was unable to pass the bar or whose conduct was so egregious
as to warrant disbarment. 9 The benefit of permitting partnerships between
lawyers and nonlawyers is not in allowing nonlawyers to engage in the
practice of law, but in the ability of a single entity to provide legal and nonle-
gal services to clients.24°
G. Violation ofProhibited Fee-Splitting
MDPs arguably run afoul of the current rules governing the sharing of
legal fees between lawyers and nonlawyers. 241 Model Rule 5.4(a) generally
prohibits a lawyer from splitting fees the lawyer receives for the provision of
legal services with a nonlawyer.242 The Model Code also prohibits the sharing
of legal fees between a lawyer and nonlawyer, except in specified circum-
stances.24 Two basic concerns gave rise to the prohibition on fee-splitting
237. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 22 (asserting that nonlawyer partners
would have no more difficulty in avoiding practice of law than nonlawyer employees).
238. See iUL ("The reality is that the rules requiring lawyers to be responsible for such non-
lawyers' actions apply in this case, just as they do for paralegals or any other nonlawyer.");
supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text (discussing Model Rules holding lawyers responsi-
ble for ethical violations of nonlawycrs).
239. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 34, at 22 (arguing that most lawyers would not
enter partnerships with nonlawyers who failed bar admission or were disbarred).
240. See id. at 23 (suggesting that real benefit of MDPs is in provision of ancillary
services).
241. See MODEL RULES, supra note 54, Rule 5.4(a) (prohibiting splitting legal fees
between lawyers and nonlawyers).
242. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing Model Rule 5A(a)).
243. See MoDEL CODE, supra note 43, DR 3-102(A) (regulating sharing oflegal fees). DR
3-102(A) provides that
A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer, except that
(1) An agreement by a lawyer with his firm, partner, or associate may provide for
the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after his death, to his
estate or to one or more specified persons.
(2) A lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased
lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total
compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased
lawyer.
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that appears in the Model Rules and Model Code.2' First, the prohibition
avoids a situation, commonly referred to as "running and capping," in which
a nonlawyer recruits potential clients for the lawyer in exchange for a percent-
age ofthe lawyer's increased profits.24 Second, the ABA was concerned that
"fee-splitting between lawyer and layman... poses the possibility of control
by the layperson, interested in his own profit rather than the client's fate."
246
It already has been noted that MDP proponents argue that nonlawyer
partners are unlikely to interfere with the legal representation of clients
because any adverse consequences to the firm's reputation will damage both
lawyer and nonlawyer partners.24 It also has been noted that the desire for
profit is not the sole motivation of all nonlawyer professionals.24 Thus, it is
unlikely that permitting lawyers and nonlawyers in a partnership to split fees
would result in the nonlawyer controlling the judgment of the lawyer.249 Even
one opponent of MDPs agrees that fee-sharing between lawyers and non-
lawyers does not impair the independence of lawyers.' 5
(3) A lawyer or law firm may include non-lawyer employees in a compensation or
retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-
sharing arrangement providing such plan does not circumvent another disci-
plinary rule.
Id.
244. See Carson, supra note 100, at 625 (examining justifications for prohibition against
fee-splitting between lawyers and nonlawyers).
245. See id. at 625-26 (examiningjustifications forprohibition against fee-splitting between
lawyers and nonlawyers).
246. See Emmons, Williams, Mires & Leach v. State Bar, 86 Cal. Rptr. 367,372 (Cal. Ct
App. 1970) (explaining primary purpose behind California's version of Model Rule 5.4(a)); see
also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-355 (1987) (explaining
that prohibition on fee-splitting avoids possibility that nonlawyer interference will unduly
influence lawyer's independent professional judgment and prevents clients from paying
unreasonably high fees); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-
1519 (1986) (arguing that prohibition protects lawyer's professional judgment from nonlawyer
control and discourages nonlawyers from engaging in unauthorized practice of law).
247. See supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text (discussing why nonlawyer partners
are unlikely to interfere with lawyer's professional judgment).
248. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text (suggesting that nonlawyers have
motivations other than making money for entering professional work).
249. See L. Harold Levinson, Essay, Independent Law Fi=s that Practice Law Only:
Society's Need, the Legal Profession 'sResponsibility, 51 OHIo ST. L.. 229,241(1990) (arguing
that fee-splitting prohibition is unjustified because sharing fees does not interfere with lawyer's
professional independence).
250. See id. (stating that restrictions on fee sharing should be relaxed to allow "law firms
to enter into fee-sharing or profit-sharing arrangements with nonlawyers, provided these
arrangements do not give the nonlawyers any equity interest or managerial role in the law firm").
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H. Economic Protectionism
Finally, although opponents of MDPs rarely use economic self-interest
to justify the prohibition on partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers,
this rationale has been underlying the prohibition since its inception into the
Canons of Professional Ethics."' As early as 1920, opponents of nonlawyer
partnerships expressed concern that, once allowed to compete in the legal
market, nonlawyers would characterize lawyers as inefficient and slothful in
efforts to solicit a greater amount of business.2 2 In 1983, many opponents of
the Kutak Commission's proposal to allow partnerships between lawyers and
nonlawyers feared that it would allow large corporations such as Sears and
Montgomery Ward to compete with lawyers in the legal market. 3  One
delegate believed that such competition would rnu the legal profession:
You each have a constituency. How willyou explain to the sole practitio-
ner who finds himselfwith competition with Sears whyyouvotedfor this?
How willyou explain to the man in the mid-size firm who isbeingput out
of business by the big eight law [sic] firm? How will you explain that? I
submit to you that you cannot on the evidencethathas beenbroughttoyou
by the Commission, because there has been no such evidence.?
251. SeeG.HAZARDJR. &W.HODES, TEE LAW OF LAWYERING: AHANDBOOKONTHE
MODELRULES OFPROFEssIONALCONDUcT471 (1985 & Supp. 1989) (suggesting that economic
protectionism is "hidden rationale" behind Model Rule 5A's prohibition on partnerships
between lawyers and nonlawycrq), Andrews, supra note 49, at 616 (noting that "economic
protectionism often can be read between the lines of the justifications given for excluding
nonlawyers from the business of law"); Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 78, at 409 (concluding
that "idea that a nationwide corporation might start offering legal services in its department
stores next to the insurance kiosk or, even worse, in the aisle between the shoes and the sporting
goods" has prevented amendment of partnership rules); Jones & Manning, supra note 112, at
1199 ("Since Rule 5.4. . . does not cover lawyer-to-lawyer relationships, and since... the rule
irrationally permits some lawyer-nonlawyer affiliations while condemning others, one must
frankly question whether the real motivation for the rule has anything to do with the core value
of protecting professional independence.").
252. See AMEMICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMnIrEB ON SUPPLEMENTING THE
CANONS OFPRoFEsSIONALETHICS: ANNOTATED CANONS, supra note 36, at 10-11 (recounting
arguments made in support of prohibition of partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers).
A 1920 report issued by a committee on the conference of delegates of bar associations stated:
The layman, a natural person or corporate, may only compete with the lawyer in the
practice of the law and the doing of law business by orally soliciting or advertising
to do it more expeditiously, faithfully, intelligently, and at less expense than the
lawyer, thereby imputing to the lawyer slothfulness, infidelity, and extortion.
Id. at 11.
253. See Unedited Transcript of ABA House of Delegates Session 28,37,46-48 (Feb. 8,
1983) (reporting comments made by various delegates concerning Kutak proposal).
254. Id. at 48-49 (presenting remarks by Al Conant). However, the ABA's official legis-
lative history of the Model Rules does not list the fear of competition as one of the reasons the
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One proponent of MDPs has argued that the existing rules prohibiting
partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers are incompatible with the policy
behind the federal antitrust laws.255 Since 1890, federal law has prohibited
combinations that restrain or inhibit trade and commerce." According to
Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner, the policy behind the antitrust laws is to
better the economic welfare of consumers through the allocation of scarce
resources and the development of more efficient products. 7 State regulations
prohibiting partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers are exempted from
federal antitrust law because, under the state action defense, the anticom-
petitive activity is carried out by private parties in accordance with clearly
articulated policies that the state actively supervises."5 However, proponents
House of Delegates rejected the Kutak Commission's proposal. See THE LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY
oF THE MODELRULES oFPROFF SoNALCoNDucT: TEmRDvEvLo~r m INTBEABAHousE
OFDELE.GATES 160 (1987) (recounting reasonsthatHouse ofDelegates rejected Kutak proposal).
255. SeeAndrews, supra note 49, at 620 (arguing that "existing rules governingthe relations
between lawyers and nonlawyers are incompatible with federal antitrust policy"). In fact, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has adopted the positionthat theABA should revoke the ethical
regulations prohibiting lawyers from entering into partnerships with nonlawyers. Id. at 620. In
an attempt to prevent Kentucky from adopting Model Rule 5.4, the Director of the FTC Bureau
of Competition wrote a letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Kentucky arguing that
Proposed Rule 5.4 would limit the ability of lawyers to establish multidisciplinary
practices with other professionals, such as psychologists or accountants, to deal
efficiently with both the legal and nonlegal aspects of specific problems. [It] ...
also would appear to bar lawyers from including any lay persons, such as marketing
directors, as partners in their law firms. Finally, such a restriction would appear to
prohibit corporate practice, and thereby prevent the use of potentially efficient busi-
ness formats ....
Id. (quoting Letter from Jeffrey L Zuckerman, Director of FTC Bureau of Competition, to
Robert F. Stephen, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Kentucky 5-6 (June 8, 1987)). The
FTC sent similar letters to numerous other courts or bar committees considering changes to their
rules. Id. at 620 n.228.
256. See Sherman Antitrust Act; § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1994)) (prohibiting contractual agreements that restrain trade or commerce).
257. 1P.AREEDA&D. u NERANTIUST LAW: ANANALYSis OFANTEIRUST PRINCI-
PIES AND THERAPIUCATION 7 (1978).
258. See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94,100 (1988) (explaining that shielding anticompet-
itive state action from federal antitrust laws requires challenged state regulation to be clearly and
affirmatively expressed as state policy and that anticompetitive conduct in question receives
active state supervision); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-70 (1984) (applying "clear
articulation" and "active supervision" analysis to determine whether Arizona's plan for deter-
mining admission to state bar constituted state action); Bates v. State Bar ofAriz., 433 U.S. 350,
359-63 (1977) (concluding state action exception exempts state supreme court mandated rules
of professional conduct from complying with antitrust laws), Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,
350-51 (1943) (finding "nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed
by its legislature").
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of MDPs argue that despite the fact states have the power to maintain the
anticompetitive regulations, the economic protection behind the prohibition
against MDPs is an illegitimate interest." 9
However, some proponents argue if the nonlegal firms continue to en-
croach on the practice of law and the legal profession fails to "expand its
ability to reach more clientele," the result will be a loss of business for tradi-
tional law firms."e They even suggest that the Commission on MDPs' focus
on the business interest of lawyers led it to conclude that MDPs should be
permitted.2 ' They submit that the Commission on MDPs determined that
unless the ABA relaxes its standards, the nonlegal firms will increasingly
threaten the viability of the legal profession.262 Thus, legal scholars disagree
about whether or not prohibiting MDPs is in the economic best interests of
lawyers.
V Arguments in Favor ofMDPs
Legal scholars who support allowing partnerships between lawyers and
nonlawyers argue that MDPs will create a number ofbenefits for clients.26 For
example, MDPs will allow law firms to meet clients' needs more efficiently"
MDPs also will lower the prices of legal services and allow law firms to offer
more services to clients.265 Finally, MDPs will provide clients with the oppor-
259. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 251, at 471("This substitution of a broad pro-
phylactic rule where a narrow one would have sufficed suggests a frith and illegitimate ration-
ale, namely economic protectionism."); Andrews, supra note 49, at 621 ("Protection of the
economic well-being of the profession is not such a valid interest."); Powell, supra note 109,
at 1468 ("When the cost of maintaining the status quo is to open the legal profession to the
charge that for the sake of money it is refusing to heed the public's call for the cautious, step-
by-step, cost-free alternative represented by the MDP proposal, it is clear that a change is
overdue.").
260. Matheson & Adams, supra note 8, at 1298.
261. See id. at 1294-96 (suggesting that Commission on MDPs' decision was based on
economic interest of legal profession).
262. See id. at 1295 (arguing that Commission on MDPs concluded that "unless the
current regulations are relaxed, these nonlegal firms will so advance their encroachment on the
MDP market that the legal profession will become severely crippled"). See generally Russell
G. PearceA Cautionary Tal From theMultidisciplinaryPracticeDebate: How the Tradition-
alists LostProfessionalism, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 985 (1999) (describing how opponents of MDPs
could cause downfall of legal profession).
263. See infra notes 267-94 and accompanying text (discussing arguments in favor of
MDPs).
264. See infra notes 267-70 and accompanying text (examining argument that MDPs will
meet clients' needs more efficiently).
265. See infra notes 274-79 and accompanying text (discussing proponents argument that
MDPs will lower prices and increase number of available services).
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The combination of legal and nonlegal services that MDPs can offer
increases efficiency by allowing a single service provider to address the legal
and nonlegal issues involved in the representation of a client." Traditional
law firms tend to analyze every problem solely from a legal standpoint, there-
by risking "two potentially harmful consequences: (1) the lawyers may fail
to perceive or may ignore important nonlegal aspects; or (2) the lawyers may
identify the nonlegal aspect of a client's problem, but may attempt to solve it
themselves without adequate nonlegal training, rather than referring the client
elsewhere."'  Even if the traditional firm recognized the nonlegal problem
and properly referred the client to nonlegal professionals, multidisciplinary
firms would be able to fulfill client needs more efficiently and economically.269
A multidisciplinary firm would be able to recognize more accurately the legal
and nonlegal aspects of a client's problem and could competently provide the
nonlegal services itself."
One MDP opponent argued that the enhanced efficiency of MDPs will
decrease the availability of legal services."' This opponent contended that
MDPs will cause legal and nonlegal talent to converge on the most profitable
geographic locations and subject areas of legal practice. 2 The result of such
a shift would be a shortage of legal services in less profitable subject areas
and geographic locations.
273
266. See infra notes 289-91 and accompanying text (noting that proponents argue that
MDPs will allow clients to obtain additional services in comfortable atmosphere).
267. See Andrews, supra note 49, at 623-25 (arguing that multidisciplinary firms could
address all facets of client problems in addition to legal aspects); Morello, supra note 6, at 239
(discussing pro-MDP argument that partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers will increase
efficiency through client ability to retain organization capable of handling both legal and
extralegal issues involved in client's representation).
268. See Andrews, supra note 49, at 623 (exploring potential disadvantages of traditional
law firm representation).
269. See id. (countering arguments against MDPs); see also Jones & Manning, supra note
112, at 1202 (arguing that MDPs could "enhance the quality of services delivered to the client
by assuring that all legal services are provided by lawyers at the same time that nonlegal
services are provided by other competent professionals"); Matheson & Adams, supra note 8,
at 1299-300 (arguing that modem clients desire convenience of one firm that can provide both
legal and nonlegal services).
270. Andrews, supra note 49, at 623.
271. See Levinson, supra note 249, at 242-43 (arguing that many disadvantages would
result if nonlegal firms heavily populated and influenced legal profession).
272. See id. at 243-44 (describing disadvantages of MDP's "one-stop shopping").
273. See id. (describing disadvantages of MDP's "one-stop shopping").
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B. Lower Prices and More Services
MDPs also will increase competition among law firs, resulting in lower
prices and more services for clients. 4 One commentator asserted that Model
Rule 5.4 creates fewer consumer alternatives through suppression of competi-
tion in the supply of legal services, thereby allowing lawyers to charge higher
fees. 75 MDPs, on the other hand, permit lawyers to concentrate solely on the
legal issues involved while simultaneously allowing nonlawyer partners to
address the nonlegal issues, thus reducing the lawyer's number of billable
hours. 6  "The client will ultimately save money because non-legal profes-
sional time is usually billed at a lower hourly rate."2"' Additionally, the
market for legal services would grow as a result of the increased competition
and investment that nonlegal companies would bring into legal services."' An
MDP would allow a law firm to supplement its income with revenue from
nonlegal services, resulting in lower prices and increased availability of legal
services to people who ordinarily would not have access to a lawyer. 9
Opponents of MDPs argue that allowing MDPs inthe United States legal
services market would leadto Big Five accounting firm control ofthe legal mar-
ket "because oftheir advantage in size, diversity, resources, and client base.
'' 8°
One such opponent suggested that MDPs run 'the risk thatthe market... will
concentrate nonlegal as well as legal services in a small number of large
firns. ' 1#8 These opponents assert that once the market has concentrated legal
274. See Conners, supra note 184, at 311 (noting MDP proponents argue that partnerships
between lawyers and nonlawyers are cost effective); Stephen Gillers, What We Talked.About
When We TalkedAbout Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.3. 243,268
(1985) (arguing Model Rule 5A serves to decrease competition and raise prices of legal ser-
vices); Morello, supra note 6, at 240-41 (describing argument that "[g]overnment regulation of
legal services typically produces a cartel in the domestic legal services market, thereby increasing
consumer prices and reducing services as compared to the prices and services in competitive
markets").
275. See Gillers, supra note 274, at 268 (describing how Model Rule 5.4 results in more
expensive legal services).
276. See Conners, supra note 184, at 311 (explaining cost-effective advantage of partner-
ships between lawyers and nonlawyers).
277. See id. (explaining cost-effective advantage of partnerships between lawyers and non-
lawyers).
278. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 46, at 982 (discussing MDP proponent arguments
regarding effects MDPs would have on legal market).
279. See Gary A. Munneke, Dances with Nonlawyers: A New Perspective on Law Firm
Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 559, 568-69 (1992) (arguing that ancillary business
activities of law firms serves to expand market for legal services through increased service
availability).
280. See Morello, supra note 6, at 241 (noting MDP opponent arguments that MDPs will
enhance monopolization of legal services resulting in decreased competition and deflated prices).
281. Levinson, supra note 249, at 243.
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services in the hands of a few large law firms, any savings from decreased fees
will be lost because the lack of competition will result in a collective rise in the
price of legal services.' Opponents fear that the ability oflaw firms to provide
ancillary services increases the risk that a firm member will encourage a client
to use those services even when they are "unnecessary, and in fact would not
have been recommended if an outside provider were needed."" One commen-
tatorpointedto a 1989 study of Florida outpatientphysicaltherapyandrehabili-
tation facilities to demonstrate that clients are more likely, upon the recommen-
dation of a professional, to use in-house or ancillary services than to seek the
services of another professional independently. 4
A similar argument that MDP opponents advance is that law firms are too
"weak and unsophisticated" to successfully compete with the experience and
power that nonlegal firms have in the marketplace.8 Opponents espousing
this view argue that because many other professions prohibit or limit the
ability of lawyers to have an interest in their organizations, the legal profes-
sion should respond in kind.28 They also assert that, unlike nonlegal profes-
sional firms, law firms lack the capital backing necessary to compete in the
marketplace.2' "It seems more likely, however, that nonlawyer-controlled
MDPs would flourish because they would have the advantages of ready
capital without the disadvantages of a principal who is directly subject to the
lawyers' standards of professional conduct.
2 89
C. Familiarity and Comfort
Partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers will enable clients to
choose multidisciplinary firms in order to retain the services of a nonlawyer
member with whom the clients are familiar.28 9 This client loyalty would have
282. See Morello, supra note 6, at 241 (discussing MDP opponent arguments concerning
higher legal fees).
283. See Carson, supra note 100, at 603-04 (arguing MDPs result in increased attorney
referral of clients to nonlawyer partners even when nonlawyer partner services are unnecessary).
284. See id. at 604 & n.60 (arguing MDPs result in increased attorney referral of clients
to nonlawyer partners even when nonlawyer partner services are unnecessary); see also Levin-
son, supra note 249, at 242 (arguing that MDPs create risk that "law firm[s], having made an
economic commitment to [their] nonlaw personnel, will tend to use them at full capacity,
whether clients happen to need their services or not").
285. See Powell, supra note 109, at 1460 (noting that Lawrence Fox and others question
legal professions ability to compete with Big Five accounting firms).
286. See id. at 1461 (recognizing tit-for-tat argument espoused by some opponents of
MDPs).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1462.
289. See Conners, supra note 184, at 311-12 (discussing MDP proponent argument that
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two benefits. First; it would allow the client to remain comfortable while
obtaining additional services, because the client would not have to deal with
an unfamiliar individual.' Second, because of the tendency of clients to
remain with familiar service providers, each partner would bring a number of
potential clients to the partnership in the form of the partner's own client
base.21
Opponents of MDPs argue that although the Model Rules allow lawyers
in traditional law firms to refer clients, to bring in new clients, and to refer
them to the appropriate department of the law firm, MDPs create a distinct
situation with new concerns.' "[A] lawyer, by virtue of his training, can be
expected to know when he has crossed the line between an innocent recom-
mendation and a prohibited referral or solicitation. If he crosses the line, he
can be disciplined."' By contrast; a nonlawyer partner who is unfamiliar
with the rules governing professional responsibility is unlikely "to know the
distinction, and cannot be disciplined for his lack of knowledge.1."
4
V. Multidisciplinary Commission Recommendation
Although the Commission on MDPs issued a second recommendation in
March 2000,2 5 this Part will examine only the provisions of the Commission
on MDPs' June 1999 Recommendation. That recommendation to the ABA 
96
advocates changes to the Model Rules that would not unnecessarily inhibit the
development of MDPs. 7 However, the recommendation suggests that the
legal profession should take special precautions to protect the "core values"
clients will follow professionals with whom they are familiar even if those professionals join
MDPs).
290. See Morello, supra note 6, at 244 (noting that MDP proponents "state that MDPs
nurture client comfort and confidence with legal representation" and examining how MDPs
involving Big Six accounting firms satisfy needs of multinational corporate clients).
291. See Carson, supra note 100, at 610-11 (describing symbiotic relationship between
attorney and nonlawyer partner centering on enhanced client base).




295. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing Commission's second recom-
mendation).
296. See infra notes 297-311 and accompanying text (discussing recommendation made
by Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice to House of Delegates).
297. See Commission on MuidisciplinwyPracficeReport Recommendationsupra note
1, 1 ("The legal profession should ... not permit existing rules to unnecessarily inhibit the
development of new structures for the more effective delivery of services and better public
access to the legal system.").
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of the legal profession."5 For instance, the recommendation retains the pro-
hibition against nonlawyers practicing law, requires lawyers in MDPs to
maintain professional independence of judgment,3 ° imputes the conflicts of
interests of any client to the entire MDP, °1 and applies the rules of profes-
sional conduct to an MDP.3° The recommendation also requires lawyers to
make certain that clients are aware of the different obligations that lawyers
and nonlawyers may have with respect to disclosure of client information.0 3
Under the recommendation, lawyers in MDPs would be required to ensure
that the conduct of nonlawyers is not inconsistent with the lawyers' profes-
sional obligations.
3 °4
In particular, the recommendation focuses on permitting lawyers to share
legal fees with nonlawyers in a manner that protects the "core values" of the
legal profession." 5 The Model Rules would continue to prohibit lawyers from
splitting fees with nonlawyers, except in the case of lawyer-controlled MDPs
or nonlawyer-controlled MDPs subject to particular safeguards."m Further-
298. See id. ("The legal profession should adopt and maintain rules of professional conduct
that protect its core values, independence of professional judgment, protection of confidential
client information, and loyalty to the client through evidence of conflicts of interest .... ").
299. See id. 4 ("Nonlawyers in an MDP, or otherwise, should not be permitted to deliver
legal services.").
300. See id. 6 ("A lawyer acting in accordance with a nonlawyer supervisor's resolution
of a question of professional duty should not thereby be excused from failing to observe the rule
of professional conduct").
301. See id. 8 ("[A]H clients of an MDP should be treated as the lawyer's clients for pur-
poses of conflicts of interest and imputation in the same manner as if the MDP were a law firm
and all employees, partners, shareholders or the like were lawyers.").
302. See id. 7 ("All rules of professional conduct that apply to a law firm should also
apply to an MDP.").
303. See id. 9 ("[A] lawyer should be required to make reasonable efforts to ensure that
the client sufficiently understands that the lawyer and nonlawyer may have different obligations
with respect to disclosure of client information and that the courts may treat the client's
communications to the lawyer and nonlawyer differently.").
304. See id. 10 ("A lawyer in an NDP who delivers legal services to a client of the
MDP... should be required to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the MDP has in effect
measures to ensure that the nonlawyer's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations
ofthe lawyer.").
305. See id. 2 ("A lawyer should be permitted to share legal fees with a nonlawyer,
subject to certain safeguards that prevent erosion of the core values of the legal profession.").
306. See id. 12 (allowing fee sharing in MDP). The recommendation states:
A lawyer should not share legal fees with a nonlawyer ... except that a lawyer in
an MDP controlled by lawyers should be permitted to do so and a lawyer in an
MDP not controlled by lawyers should be permitted to do so subject to safeguards
similar to those identified in [another provision].
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more, allowing lawyers and nonlawycrs to split fees within an MDP would not
change the current rules "limiting the holding of equity investments in any
entity or organization providing legal services.""
In the case of nonlawyer-controlled MDPs, the Commission on MDPs'
recommendation requires that the MDP give a number of written assurances
"to the highest court with the authority to regulate the legal profession in each
jurisdiction in which the MDP is engaged in the delivery of legal services.
'3 8
For instance, the MDP must promise that the MDP will not interfere with the
lawyers' professional judgment ° and that the firm will segregate clients'
funds in accordance with the professional obligations of the lawyer.310 Fi-
307. Id. 13.
308. Id. 14. Butsee Terry, supra note 168, at 1619 (recommending that any certification
and audit procedure apply to all MDP lawyers not just nonlawyer controlled MDPs in order to
ensure greater familiarity and compliance with these types of provisions); Laurel S. Terry, A
Primer OnMPs: Should the ' Vo"Rule Become a New Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 869,932-33
(1999) (asserting that court audits of MDP lawyers should include lawyer controlled MDPs as
well).
309. Commision on Multidisciplinary Practice Report: Recommendation, supra note 1,
14(A).
310. Id. 14(C). The recommendation states that the MDP's written assurances should
provide that
(A) it will not directly or indirectly interfere with a lawyer's exercise of independ-
ent professional judgment on behalf of a client;
(B) it will establish, maintain and enforce procedures designed to protect a lawyer's
exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf of a client from interfer-
ence by the MDP, any member of the MDP, or any person or entity controlled by
the MD1h,
(C) it will establish, maintain and enforce procedures to protect a lawyer's profes-
sional obligation to segregate client funds;
(D) the members ofthe MDP delivering or assisting in the delivery of legal services
will abide by the rules of professional conduct;
(E) it will respect the unique role of the lawyer in society as an officer of the legal
system, a representative of clients and a public citizen having special responsibility
for the administration ofjustie. This undertaking should acknowledge that lawyers
in an MDP have the same special obligation to render voluntarypro bonopublico
legal service as lawyers practicing solo or in law firms;
(F) it will annually review the procedures established in subsection (B) and amend
them as needed to ensure their effectiveness; and annually certify its compliance
with subsections (A)-(F) and provide a copy of the certification to each lawyer in
the MDP;
(G) it will annually file a signed and verified copy of the certificate described in
subsection (F) with the court, along with relevant information about each lawyer
who is a member of the MDPI,
(H) it will permit the court to review and conduct an administrative audit of the
MDP, as each such authority deems appropriate, to determine and assure compli-
ance with subsections (A}-(G); and
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nally, the court may withdraw permission from the MDPs to deliver legal
services or impose other appropriate sanctions upon an MDP for failure to
comply with the its written assurances."'
VfI. Analysis
Although the traditional arguments against MDPs raise some concerns
that the present Model Rules do not adequately address, these arguments are
themselves inadequate to justify the total prohibition on lawyer and nonlawyer
partnerships currently found in Model Rule 5.4.312 Furthermore, the number
of states presently investigating and considering MDPs suggests that there is
a strong push in favor of these partnerships that is likely to go forward with
or without the approval ofthe ABA.3"3 If the Model Rules are to continue to
provide guidance to the states in developing their own ethical regulations, the
ABA must develop rules that both allow lawyers to enter MDPs and ade-
quately address the ethical concerns MDPs raise.314 As the Commission on
MDPs' recommendation suggests, the ABA needs to make changes to a
number of the Model Rules in order to provide for the development of MDPs
while simultaneously protecting the "core values" of the legal profession.
315
A. Professional Independence of a Lawyer
In order to allow lawyers to enter MDPs, the ABA House of Delegates
must remove Model Rule 5.4(b), which prohibits a lawyer from entering into
a partnership with a nonlawyer.1 6 The ABA must also eliminate Model Rule
5.4(d), which prohibits a lawyer from practicing law in a corporation or
(1) it will bear the cost of the administrative audit of MDPs described in subpara-
graph (H) though the payment of an annual certification fee.
Id. 14.
311. See id. 15 ("An MDP that fails to comply with its written undertaking shall be
subject to withdrawal of its permission to deliver legal services or to other appropriate remedial
measures ordered by the court.").
312. See supra notes 95-262 and accompanying text (discussing arguments against MDPs
and their counter arguments).
313. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (noting that number of states presently are
examining benefits and risks of MDPs).
314. See MODEL Ru Es OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT: CHMEPTRSON'S INTRODUCHON
(1999) ("The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are intended to serve as a national frame-
work for implementation of standards of professional conduct").
315. See Commission on MultidisciplinaryPracticeReport: Recommendation, supra note
1, 1 (recommending legal profession adopt rules that would permit MDPs).
316. See MODELRULEs, supra note 54, Rule 5.4(b) (forbidding lawyer/nonlawyer partner-
ship if any partnership activity involves practice of law).
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association that a nonlawyer owns, directs, or supervises.3" Because non-
lawyer partners in an MDP are unlikely to interfere with the professional
judgment of a lawyer, it is not necessary for the ABA to make any additional
changes to the Model Rules to protect the professional independence of
lawyers within MDPs.31 Indeed, the Commission on MDPS recognized that
many lawyers already work in settings where they are supervised or subject
to oversight by nonlawyers, and they have maintained independence in those
settings." 9 However, to clarify the position of the ABA and to quiet the fears
of opponents, the House of Delegates should consider adding a provision to
Model Rule 5.4, similar to the Commission on MDPs' recommended amend-
ment, providing that a lawyer subject to nonlawyer supervision is not excused
from exercising the lawyer's independent professional judgment in order to
comply with the rules of professional conduct.32°
B. Client Confidentiality
The Commission on MDPs' recommendation suggests that any change
in the Model Rules to accommodate MDPs should include a change to Model
Rule 1.6 to protect confidential client information.32 However, agency law
and existing legal and nonlegal ethical regulations adequately protect client
confidences by giving the client power to direct nondisclosure and by subject-
ing lawyers and nonlawyers to liability for unauthorized disclosures.' z Thus,
in order to accommodate MDPs and to continue to protect client confidences,
the ABA should not make any significant changes to Model Rule 1.6. Rather,
the ABA should simply add a provision requiring the lawyer to "make reason-
able efforts to ensure that the client sufficiently understands that the lawyer
and nonlawyer may have different obligations with respect to disclosure of
client information."
32
317. See id. Rule 5.4(d) (regulating attorney practice in professional corporations and
associations).
318. See supra notes 106-21, 125-27 and accompanying text (explaining -why MDPs do
not interfere with professional independence of lawyers).
319. Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice: Report, supra note 95, 9.
320. See Commission onMulidisciplinaryPracticeReport: Recommendation, supra note
1, 6 (recommending adoption of provision to protect lawyer's independence of professional
judgment).
321. See id. 1 ("The legal profession should adopt and maintain rules of professional
conduct that protect... confidential client information... but should not permit existing rules
to unnecessarily inhibit the development of [MDPs]Y).
322. See supra notes 151-65 and 175-183 and accompanying text (explaining why MDPs
do not jeopardize client confidentiality).
323. See Commission onMultidisciplinaryPractice Report: Recommendation,supra note
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Additionally, the ABA should amend the Model Rules specifically to
allow clients who wish to obtain both legal and audit services from a single
MDP prospectively to waive confidentiality with regard to information
relevant to the audit.3 24 Scholars currently disagree about whether a prospec-
tive waiver of confidentiality would be void under the current regulations."2
Thus, a rule explicitly providing for prospective waiver for such clients would
remove any uncertainty and alleviate the concerns of the SEC. 26
C. Attorney-Client Privilege
MDPs do not significantly increase the risk that nonlawyers or clients
will waive attorney-client privileges. 32 The attomey-client privilege already
protects communications to nonlawyer agents who facilitate representation."
Lawyers who negligently allow nonlawyer agents to waive attorney-client
privileges through the disclosure of confidential client information are subject
to liability for breach of the duty of confidentiality.sr Thus, no change to
existing law is required in order to protect attorney-client privileges within an
MDP.
D. Conflicts ofInterests
The Commission on MDPs correctly recommended that the ABA amend
Model Rule 1.10 to impute the conflicts of interest of nonlawyers' clients
to the entire MDP.33° Although courts and ethics committees likely would
extend current Rule 1.10 to impute the nonlawyers' conflicts to the law-
1, 9 (recommending attorney inform client of different obligations of lawyer and nonlawyer
concerning disclosure of confidential client information).
324. See supra notes 166-83 and accompanying text (discussing concerns over nonlawyers
duty to disclose).
325. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text (noting arguments by Lawrence Fox
and Richard Painter).
326. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's fears regarding
MDPs).
327. See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text (discussing how existing law ade-
quately protects attorney-client privileges in MDP context).
328. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (noting that attorney-client privilege
protects communications to lawyers and nonlawyer agents).
329. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (noting that lawyers are liable for negli-
gent acts of their agents).
330. See Commission on Multidisciplinaiy Report: Recommendation, supra note 1, 8
("[A]lI clients of an MDP should be treated as the lawyer's clients for purposes of conflicts of
interest and imputation in the same manner as if the MDP were a law firm and all [nonlawyers]
were lawyers.").
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yer,331 Rule 1.10, as currently written, does not provide explicitly for such
imputation.332 Thus, an amendment to Rule 1.10 to provide explicitly for such
imputation would clarifythe conflict of interest provisions ofthe Model Rules
as they relate to MDPs and would quiet the concerns of some MDP opponents
who fear an explosion of conflicts problems.
E. Unauthorized Practice of Law
No change in the Model Rules is necessary to prevent nonlawyers from
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. The Model Rules already hold
a lawyer responsible for the conduct of his nonlawyer employees when that
conduct violates the ethical regulations.333 These rules also prohibit a lawyer
from assisting a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice oflaw.334 Nonlawyers
in an MDP would still be subject to the general restriction prohibiting non-
lawyers from delivering legal services. 35
F. Prohibited Fee-Splitting
Finally, in order to accommodate MDPs, the ABA must amend the
prohibition against lawyers sharing fees with nonlawyers found in Model Rule
5.4(a).336 Permitting lawyers and nonlawyers to split fees will not result in
nonlawyers controlling the professional judgment of lawyers. 37  As the
Commission on MDPs suggested, Rule 5.4 must be amended to allow lawyers
to split fees with nonlawyers, at least in the MDP context.
338
331. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text (explaining why Model Rule 1.10
would likely be extended to impute nonlawyers' conflicts to lawyers within MDP).
332. See MODEL RULES, supra note 54, Rule 1.10 (providing general rules for imputed
disqualification).
333. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text (explaining that Model Rules hold
lawyers responsible for nonlawyer employee's violations).
334. See supra notes 231-40 and accompanying text (explaining that nonlawyers in MDPs
already are prohibited from practicing law).
335. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text (demonstrating that nonlawyers in
MDPs are not exempt from restrictions prohibiting unauthorized practice of law).
336. See MODEL RULES, supra note 54, Rule 5.4(a) (regulating fee-splitting between
attorneys and nonlawyers).
337. See supra notes 106-21, 125-27 and accompanying text (discussing why MDPs will
not compromise professional independence of lawyers).
338. See Commission onMultidisciplinary Practice Report: Recommendationsupra note
1, 12 (stating that "[a] lawyer should not share legal fees with a nonlawyer... except that a
lawyer in an MDP ... should be permitted to do so"). However, the Commission on MDPs
recommended that allowing fee-sharing and ownership interest in the MDP context does not
change "current provisions limiting the holding of equity investments in any entity or organiza-
tion providing legal services." Id. 13.
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VIII. Conclusion
Although the ABA consistently has maintained the prohibition against
partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers since 1928,"' 9 the traditional
arguments against allowing lawyers and nonlawyers to enter partnerships are
inadequate to justify the total prohibition on MDPs that currently is found in
Model Rule 5.4.340 Likewise, the economic protectionism rationale underlying
the prohibition constitutes an illegitimate basis for the restriction 41 Further-
more, MDPs would enable law firms to meet their clients' needs more effi-
ciently,342 lower the cost of legal representation, 343 and increase the availabil-
ity of legal services.3 " In order to accommodate MDPs, the ABA must
change Model Rule 5.4(b) to permit lawyers and nonlawyers to enter partner-
ships.345  Additionally, the ABA must make a number of important, but
simple, changes to various other rules to protect the "core values" of the legal
profession.346 In order to adequately advise the numerous states that currently
are considering providing their citizens with the numerous advantages that
MDPs have to offer,347 the ABA should adopt the necessary changes to allow
MDPs.
339. See supra notes 34-63 and accompanying text (recounting history and development
of prohibition on MDPs).
340. See supra notes 95-262 and accompanying text (examining arguments against MDPs
and their counter arguments).
341. See supra notes 251-62 and accompanying text (discussing economic self-interest
rationale for prohibition against MDPs).
342. See supra notes 267-73 and accompanying text (discussing how MDPs would
increase efficiency).
343. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text (noting argument that MDPs would
reduce the cost of legal services).
344. See supra notes 278-79 and accompanying text (arguing that MDPs would increase
the availability of legal services).
345. See supra notes 312-15 and accompanying text (asserting that Model Rule 5.4 must
be changed in order to accommodate MDPs).
346. See supra notes 316-38 and accompanying text (examining changes to Model Rules
necessary to accommodate MDPs).
347. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (noting that number of states are presently
considering MDPs); see also Schneyer, supra note 25, at 1473-76 (arguing that MDP legaliza-
tion is inevitable in United States and suggesting that MDP supporters may leave ABA on
sidelines and seek legalization elsewhere).
